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ABSTRACT
The legislators of the Second United States House of 
Representatives faced a set of challenging military and political 
problems when they met in November 1791. The issue of what would 
be the primary means of the young nation's defense had not yet 
been determined. The old British and colonial precedents of a 
militia as the first line of defense were firmly rooted in the 
minds of the most congressmen meeting in Philadelphia. Many of 
the legislators had been indelibly imprinted with a fear of a 
large standing army in peacetime from their own personal 
experiences in the pre-Revolutionary days. Many of those who 
would become stalwarts of the Republican Party in later years 
felt that a militia, while often militarily ineffective, 
preserved the republican virtues on which the nation depended for 
its moral underpinnings. Others, who were usually in the ranks 
of the future Federalist party, felt that a well-trained regular 
federal force was the only practical military solution for the 
nation's long-term needs, barring vast improvements in the 
training and discipline of the state militia forces.
Underlying both considerations by the members of the Second 
Congress was the pressing need for a military solution of some 
sort in the Northwest Territory. With a series of military 
embarrassments suffered at the hands of the frontier Indian 
tribes, the issue of how best to achieve military respectability
V l l
took its place alongside other important matters in the Second 
Congress. Occurring also at this time was the emergence of 
factions that would later evolve into two distinct and 
antagonistic political parties.
Aside from the standard methods of research, such as 
examining the debates of Congress and studying newspapers and 
documents of the time, I used the Rice-Beyle cluster bloc 
analysis technique to discover the existence of congressional 
voting patterns. This method examines the voting behavior of 
paired congressmen to determine similar voting behavior. I 
separated the roll calls dealing with the issues of a stronger, 
reorganized militia from those pertaining to a more potent 
regular army for use on the frontier and analyzed both sets of 
data for voting patterns. I also examined the voting patterns 
for all 102 roll calls of this Congress. In the end, I 
discovered that smaller groups of legislators than I expected 
voted together consistently on military issues, while voting in 
opposing factions on the overall business of the House.
viii
INTRODUCTION
Whenever the militia comes to an end, or is despised or 
neglected, I shall consider this union dissolved, and the 
liberties of North America lost forever.
John Adams, 1823.1
Among the numerous proposals faced by the First Session of 
the Second Congress was the Uniform Militia Act. In its final 
form, this act required "that each and every free able-bodied 
white male citizen of the respective States, resident therein, 
who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the 
age of forty-five years, (except as hereinafter excepted) shall 
severally, and respectively, be enrolled in the Militia by the 
Captain or commanding officer of the company, within whose bounds 
such citizen shall reside, and that within twelve months after 
the passing of this act."2 Finally approved on May 8, 1792, the 
bill provided what little federal guidance the state militia were 
to receive for over a century.3
The passage of the Uniform Militia Act came over two years 
after Secretary of War Henry Knox proposed his original plan for 
a universal militia for American male citizenry. In Knox's plan 
of January 1790 the militia of the country were to be classed 
into three categories, according to their ages. The three 
classes were: an advanced corps of men aged 18 to 20; a main 
corps of men 21 to 45; and a reserved corps of men 46 to 60. In 
this overly ambitious plan, each young male would have to 
participate in periodic militia training in order to be eligible
1
2to vote, hold office, or exercise legal rights. Also, the 
federal government would provide the men with all arms, 
equipment, and clothing. The act did not specify what groups or 
persons would be exempted from the provisions of this compulsory 
military service. It was prohibitively expensive for a nation 
as young as the United States.4 According to Richard H. Kohn, 
one of the leading historians of the military during the 
Federalist period, "the administration purposely phrased its 
recommendations in exaggerated forms in hope that after the 
inevitable debates and compromises in Congress, the final 
legislation would retain those provisions necessary to transform 
the militia into a viable institution.1,5 This rather devious 
political scheming seems unlikely, but whether or not this was 
the underlying motive of Washington and Knox, the much-modified 
plan that Congress ultimately approved in 1792 bore little 
resemblance to Knox's original outline for the militia.
One basis for much of the debate concerning the role of the 
militia during this period was a traditional fear of a standing 
army. The preference for local defense goes back not only to 
American colonial times, but as far back as the time of Alfred 
the Great in England itself. Although the British model for 
militia service proved more popular in its idealized form than 
when put into actual application, the concept of a defensive 
force composed of the average yeomanry retained its appeal when 
transplanted to the American colonies.6 Early settlers 
migrating to this land from England also brought with them bitter 
memories of the later Stuart years and the abuses of a standing 
army.7
3The experiences of Americans in the years prior to the 
Revolution did nothing to persuade them of the need for a heavily 
armed garrison in major population centers. Samuel Adams, the 
patriot and rabble-rouser, stated in 1768:
It is a very improbable supposition that any people 
can long remain free, with a strong military power in the 
very heart of their country. . . .
Even where there is a necessity of the military power, 
within the land, which by the way but rarely happens, a wise 
and prudent people will always have a watchful & a jealous 
eye over it; for the maxims and rules of the army, are 
essentially different from the genius of a free people, and 
the laws of a free government.8
Thus, to those who feared the trampling of civil liberties by a 
dangerous standing army, a system of state militia seemed the 
safest path. As religious, legal, and economic institutions were 
adapted from British practice, so too were military institutions. 
Having the same history and culture as the mother country, it was 
natural for the ex-British colonies to continue the British 
militia custom.
From the early days of the republic, concern for military 
security was an important consideration. After ridding 
themselves of British rule, the new nation's builders set out to 
enumerate the citizens with a census, an undertaking with 
military implications. Not only were over three million citizens 
to be counted for purposes of representation and taxation, but 
also they were being counted for their potential role in 
defending the country. According to Carroll D. Wright, the act 
approved March 1, 1790, required the census marshals gathering 
data "to distinguish the sex and color of free persons and free 
males of 16 years and upward from those under that age; in the
4latter case, undoubtedly, for the purpose of ascertaining the 
military and industrial strength of the country."9
A complicating factor at work in the establishment of a 
military plan for the new country was that of state versus 
federal authority. To the Federalists, who favored a strong 
central government, the weakness of the state militia tended to 
make the country itself weak. Leading Federalists like Alexander 
Hamilton cited the unpreparedness of the state militia during 
Shays's Rebellion as evidence of the danger of lack of central 
control of the military. However, Antifederalists were confident 
that the militia could handle most military situations capably 
enough, citing the performance of militia at the battles of 
Lexington, Bunker's Hill, and Saratoga as proof of militia 
prowess. In fact, "Antifederalists interpreted the militia 
provision [of the Constitution] as an attack on state power, an 
attempt to undercut the states by lodging the basis of 
sovereignty, the purse and the sword, in the national 
government. "10
While the First and Second Congresses wrangled over such 
issues as establishing a United States bank, a mint, and a post 
office, the matter of a nationally regulated militia languished 
on the floor of Congress. The committee of the First Congress in 
charge of making Knox's militia proposal workable took five 
months to create a bill, and when it did appear in July 1790 it 
resembled Knox's original plan only in that it still contained 
provisions for a select corps of militia. From July 1790 until 
November 1791 the militia bill rarely emerged from committee, as 
Congress was absorbed by matters that seemed more pressing at the
5time, such as Hamilton's financial programs. However, action on 
the Uniform Militia Act accelerated with news in December 1791 of 
the St. Clair defeat. The utter rout of Arthur St. Clair's 
poorly trained troops, composed in large part of militia, shocked 
Congress and spurred interest in the Uniform Militia Act, which 
had been gathering dust in committee.11 With only 500 of the 
1,400 men in General St. Clair's army escaping unharmed from an 
Indian ambush, public pressure to improve the military posture of 
the country suddenly and not surprisingly increased.12
In a flurry of activity Congress began to investigate St. 
Clair's defeat, and began to consider more seriously earlier 
legislative proposals that now seemed suddenly relevant. 
Congressional attention was directed toward two major measures.
In addition to the Uniform Militia Act, the Congress also had 
before it an "Act for making further and more effectual provision 
for the protection of the Frontiers" (the Five-Regiment Bill), an 
act which would significantly increase the strength of the 
regular forces arrayed against the Indians.13
The Uniform Militia Act cannot be considered apart from the 
Five-Regiment Bill. This is true not only because of their 
proximity on the legislative agenda, but also because of the 
differing philosophies the bills represent on military matters. 
For some congressmen, the notion of a sturdy militia was the 
foundation of the nation's military strength. For others, more 
pragmatic in their outlook, the key to the nation's strength lay 
in having a well-trained regular military force that could endure 
extended campaigning. The debates over each bill served to bring 
out the merits of both points of view, and provided a forum for
6the concerns of many legislators over the country's military 
future.
During the debates over the bills to increase the regular 
army and to solidify the militia into a national force, the 
incipient partisanship that had been brewing in the early 
Congress began to solidify. To the southerners and westerners 
who were against Federalist taxation and financial programs, the 
military disasters in the West were a good opportunity to 
embarrass the Federalist administration and accuse it of plotting 
the introduction of a standing army. For example, early 
dissenters took the chance to expose Federalist military bumbling 
by launching a Congressional inquiry into the St. Clair fiasco. 
However, the opposition was also embarrassed, because it could 
not present a solid front against the Five-Regiment Bill.
Frontier districts in the South and West were quick to demand 
that their representatives in Congress provide actual protection 
against the very real Indian threat on their frontier. Even 
James Madison, already a leading opponent of Federalist policies, 
could not oppose the Five Regiment Bill because of his home 
state's exposed frontier.14 Sectional and partisan concerns thus 
played against each other throughout the debates concerning the 
funding of the nation's growing military. During an April 1792 
vote on a "bill to raise a further sum of money for the 
protection of the frontiers" by increasing the duty on imported 
hemp and cordage and placing a duty on imported cotton, 
representatives split along sectional lines. Southern 
congressmen would vote for a bill that protected southern cotton,
7while Northern congressmen would not vote to raise revenue for 
the increasing military if the bill seemed to favor the South.15
When the Uniform Militia Act finally came to a vote in the 
House in March 1792, the bill had been emasculated considerably. 
It had no administrative structure to assure training and 
compliance with national standards, nor did it provide for fines 
for noncompliance with the act. Gone also was any sign of Knox's 
system of classing men into age groups. Pressure from several 
interest groups had resulted in the bill being reduced in scope 
and strength. Many tradesmen resented the classing aspect of the 
bill, which could take young apprentices far from their trades 
for long periods of time. Quakers resented the lack of 
exemptions on religious grounds. Individual states felt that any 
federally imposed system of fines for failure to muster would be 
an infringement on their rights as self-governing units. The act 
as finally passed was so inoffensive and vague in its language 
that it provided a mere skeleton for the operation of state 
militia.16
And yet, for all its weakness, the bill established the 
principle that all able-bodied men owed their government military 
service, that they must be trained to provide that service 
efficiently, and that in event of war the United States intended 
to fight with a mass citizen army. As a policy the act was a 
failure; but it was a policy that had far-reaching ideological 
implications for the nation. It reflected, surely, an influence 
of the French Revolution, as well as British history and colonial
experience.
8According to Richard H. Kohn, the weakness of the Uniform 
Militia Act played into the hands of those Federalists who 
desired a strong national military establishment. Although 
Russell Weigley views the passage of the Uniform Militia Act as a 
major foundation of American military policy until the twentieth 
century, Kohn sees it differently.17 In Kohn's words:
When the first session of the Second Congress 
adjourned in early summer 1792, the United States had 
crossed a watershed in the development of its military 
institutions. Congress had created the first effective 
peacetime army and, in the Uniform Militia Act, had dealt a 
crushing blow to an already dying militia system.18
During the remainder of this study, I will examine the
motives of the men who hammered out the significant military
legislation of the Second Congress, both those who favored it in
its final form and those opposed it. I will determine their
attitudes from a study of the Annals of Congress, in which their
debates appear, in contemporary newspapers, in other primary
materials, and in their biographies. Most importantly, I will
examine the Journals of the House of Representatives, which
indicate how each Representative voted on every issue that came
to a roll call. Occasionally it will be found that one who said
yea in debate, said nay when he cast his vote. My hypothesis is
that the men of the Second Congress cast their votes on military
issues in roughly the same pattern they displayed on other
issues, with the exception that the members were more likely to
display parochial or personal attitudes on military issues than
they may have on such issues as funding the debt or establishing
the post office.
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CHAPTER ONE: BIBLIOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND
The subject of the early American nation's political 
development has received extensive treatment by historians. The 
political nature of the infant nation's militia development, 
however, has not received the sort of attention it merits by 
historians of the period. Possibly this is due to the 
unglamorous nature of the militia issue when compared to more 
exciting matters at hand in the early Congresses, such as uneasy 
relationships with European powers and establishment of 
precedent-setting governmental policies such as funding the 
national debt or establishing the national bank. Occasional open 
warfare that flared on the frontier between settlers and Indians 
as the frontier advanced made the militia issue seem rather 
unspectacular. While these and other easily identifiable issues 
are dealt with at length by general histories of the Federalist 
period, the argument over what was to be the role of the state 
militia in the defense of the country has generally received 
short shrift in the studies of the era. With a couple of notable 
exceptions, historians have usually slighted the admittedly 
unevenly performing militia forces of the period in favor of 
detailing the more concrete and easily explained feats of the 
regular army troops of the day.
Two historians who have effectively covered the issue of the 
militia's status in the developing nation are John K. Mahon and
10
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Richard H. Kohn. Kohn, in his thorough Eagle and Sword: The 
Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in 
America. 1783-1802, details the issues of state versus federal 
control of the military, military and frontier difficulties, and 
political considerations entering into congressional military 
decisions. Kohn covers the combination of factors leading up to 
the passage of the Uniform Militia Act more completely than any 
other historian. He suggests that the strong Federalist support 
of the act was a roundabout effort to subvert the existing state 
militia systems by diluting the effectiveness of the militias; 
this seems a bit excessive. However, Kohn makes a plausible case 
elsewhere in his work for the strong conspiratorial atmosphere of 
the Federalist period, with emphasis on the Newburgh conspiracy 
and Hamilton's suspiciously enlarged and politically 
discriminatory 1798 army.1
John K. Mahon's The American Militia: Decade of Decision. 
1789-1800. while not as extensive or as speculative as Kohn's 
opus, covers the atrophy of the American militia system in an 
adequate, if brief, manner.2 Mahon details the roundabout 
journey of the Uniform Militia Act from committee to committee 
until its ultimate emasculation. He notes especially the damage 
done by the omission of a select corps of ready militia in the 
bill's final form.3 Mahon is also one of the very few historians 
who attempt to document the aftermath of the Uniform Militia Act 
by delving into its operation in individual states. He concludes 
that the bill received uneven enforcement in different states, 
varying in vigor according to the needs and inclination of those 
states' administrations.4
12
Another historian who covers the issue of militia in the 
Federalist period is Lawrence Delbert Cress. His Citizens in 
Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of
1812. although emphasizing political philosophies at the time 
regarding military matters, gives an interesting account of how 
British radical Whig philosophers influenced the leading American 
thinkers of the day, imbuing them with the notion of the 
militia's purity of spirit as opposed to the evils of a standing 
army. Cress shows that such British thinkers as James Harrington, 
John Trenchard, and David Hume had a direct effect on Jefferson, 
Madison, and others who later adopted the Republican Party as 
their instrument to contest the threatened infringements on 
citizens' liberties posed by Hamilton's Federalists.5
For source material on the period under consideration, the 
Annals of the Congress of the United States and the Journal of 
the House of Representatives were invaluable.6 The Annals of 
Congress were especially useful since they provided coverage of 
the debates on military affairs that took place on the floor of 
the House. Although the procedural verbiage of the legislators 
often took time to decipher, the florid and often passionate 
diatribes by congressmen in defense of their respective points of 
view on military issues were illuminating and even entertaining. 
Since at this time the Senate debated in secret, the proceedings 
of that body provided very little insight into what Senators 
thought on issues. The Journals, while short on the 
give-and-take of debates, furnished a useful double-check on roll
calls and dates.
13
Useful in providing background into the general period of 
the 1790's were some of the newspapers of the day. The Boston 
Gazette carried especially good coverage of the Indian problems 
on the frontier, much of which was reprinted from the frontier 
newspapers of the time. Helpful in illustrating the nascent 
political polarization of the country were the Federalist United 
States Gazette (Philadelphia) and the Republican General 
Advertiser (also of Philadelphia). While these politically 
oriented newspapers dealt heatedly at times with the alleged 
despotism of the opposing party and covered a variety of foreign 
and domestic topics, occasionally a reference could be found to 
militia or army issues.
Another valuable primary source was the American State 
Papers, a collection of various government documents and 
correspondence between public officials.7 Especially interesting 
were the Indian Affairs and Military Affairs series of these 
papers. Secretary of War Knox's correspondence with President 
Washington and others was particularly engrossing as Knox tried 
to puzzle out the militia issue and the Indian situation on the 
frontier. Slightly disappointing was the Miscellaneous portion 
of the American State Papers; this section was full of random, if 
not trivial, government documents that dealt little with military 
matters.
Of the secondary works not mentioned already that deal with 
military matters during the Federalist period, what is striking 
is the number of major works that either touch only briefly on 
the militia issue, or which dismiss the militia as a military 
embarrassment. Most military historians discuss the failures of
14
Josiah Harmar and St. Clair when speaking of military matters 
during the Federalist era, as well as the militarily minor 
Whiskey Rebellion, and, inevitably, Anthony Wayne's triumph at 
Fallen Timbers when speaking of military matters during the 
Federalist era. Most do not, however, deal with the issue of the 
citizen soldier as a perceived counter to the prospective threat 
of an overly aggressive central government, as do Kohn and Cress. 
The military historian, perhaps naturally, seems to deal with 
that which is concrete and observable, while the political 
historian may delve more into what lies in men's hearts and 
minds.
Of the major military historians of the period, only Russell 
F. Weigley, in his Towards an American Army: Military Thought 
from Washington to Marshall, tries to address the issue of the 
militia as a political football.8 Weigley discusses the currents 
of military thought that led to the passage of the Uniform 
Militia Act, finally concluding, as does Kohn, that the bill 
ultimately strengthened the arguments of those favoring a regular 
army. Interestingly, in his History of the United States Army, 
an extensive survey of the country's entire military history, 
Weigley discusses the militia issue more tersely, concentrating 
on the Frontier Bill, which added to the power of the regular 
army.9
Warren W. Hassler, in With Shield and Sword: American 
Military Affairs, Colonial Times to the Present, deals with the 
militia only sketchily, as does Francis P. Prucha in his 
otherwise excellent The Sword of the Republic: The United States 
Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846.10 William H. Guthman, in his
15
March to Massacre: A History of the First Seven Years of the 
United States Army, 1784-1791, dwells on the inadequacies of the 
militia in early campaigns rather than on any potential 
contributions they may have made.11 James Ripley Jacobs, in his 
galloping The Beginnings of the U. S. Army: 1783-1812, lays the 
fault for the failure of the militia in the St. Clair campaign on 
the senior and intermediate officers who led them, rather than 
the men themselves.12 Jacobs eventually concludes, as do most 
military historians, that only regular army troops had the 
discipline to sustain a lengthy campaign against the Indians.13
Works that do not contribute greatly to an original 
perspective on the militia issue, but which provide valuable 
background on the problem, include Don Higginbotham's George 
Washington and the American Military Tradition, which 
reemphasizes Washington's oft-noted suspicion of the militia's 
staying power, and James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A 
Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic,
1763-1789.14 Two works that provide useful background in the 
pre-Revolutionary militia are John Shy's Toward Lexington: The 
Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution 
and Fred Anderson's A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and 
Society in the Seven Years' War. Anderson's work especially 
points out the personal commitment of the individual militiaman 
and the privations endured by him.15
Unusual among those writing about the Uniform Militia Act is 
Jim Dan Hill. In The Minuteman in Peace and War, he sees the
1792 act as providing a manpower reserve for use in crises.16
16
Unlike most historians, who see the Uniform Militia Act as a 
waste of effort and the militia as generally inefficient, Hill 
takes a kinder view of the subject. Hill views the act not so 
much as a piece of legislation intended for vigorous enforcement 
as "a military manpower bookkeeping arrangement with functions 
more comparable to those of the modern Selective service than to 
functional combat Companies, Regiments, Brigades, and Divisions 
in being."17 Hill's charitable view of both the Uniform Militia 
Act and the militia in general may have been due to his extensive 
personal involvement in the National Guard and his experience as 
a major general called for duty in World War II.
Three works which explore the relationship of the American 
civilian to the concept of armed service are The Civilian and the 
Military, by Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr.; Soldiers and Civilians: The 
Martial Spirit in America, 1775-1865, by Marcus Cunliffe; and 
American Democracy and Military Power: A Study of Civil Control 
of the Military Power in the United States, by Louis Smith.18 Of 
the three, Smith most directly addresses the question of the role 
of the citizen in military service, and notes that the Second 
Amendment was obsolescent almost as soon as it was ratified.
Smith also observes how the original plans of Madison and others 
for the states to act as a military check to the excesses of the 
federal government have become obsolete. Cunliffe advances the 
idea that the Uniform Militia Act worked in tandem with the 
Second Amendment to maintain a measure of state control over the 
militia, although both measures were strangely inefficient 
militarily.
For general works of the period John C. Miller's The
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Federalist Era: 1789-1801 is very good in explaining the 
financial and political dilemmas facing the new nation, but does 
not mention the militia as a political issue. Miller only 
briefly mentions the St. Clair disaster and deals mostly with the 
regular army when discussing the tensions with France later in 
the period.19 Forrest McDonald's The Presidency of George 
Washington slights the militia issue as well, but gives a lively 
perspective on the political workings of the Washington 
administration. Especially interesting is McDonald's apparent 
suggestion that, while Washington was not a dupe of Hamilton, he 
was an occasionally bemused bystander while the government was 
being established.20
For those who think that history is biography, several 
individual biographies of the leading figures of the Federalist 
period are available. While most of these biographies shed only 
a partial light on why these figures voted as they did on 
particular issues, they serve to provide background on the makeup 
and motivations of these men. The best of these are Elbridge 
Gerry: Founding Father and Republican Statesman, by George A.
Billias; Fisher Ames: Federalist and Statesman, 1758-1808. by 
Winfred E. A. Bernhard; and Evolution of a Federalist: William 
Loughton Smith of Charleston, 1758-1812. by George C. Rogers,
Jr.21 Anthony Wavne: Soldier of the Early Republic, by Paul 
David Nelson, gives a good account of Wayne's military exploits 
during the Revolution and his command of the Legion of the United 
States, but does not adequately explore Wayne's political career 
as a congressman, particularly his role in the passage of key 
military legislation.22 The personal writings of Jefferson,
18
Madison, and especially Hamilton were helpful in obtaining 
insight into the attitudes and concerns of these principal 
figures of the period.23
Irving Brant's James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 
1787-1800 gives a good account of Madison's role in the eventual 
ratification of the Constitution and his willingness to 
compromise on the militia issue for national harmony, but little 
is said about Madison's later support of the militia as a bulwark 
against federal encroachment of civil liberties.24 In his The 
Bill of Rights: Its Origin and Meaning, Brant does not provide 
extensive coverage of the Second Amendment, with its protection 
of state militia from federal prohibitions, concentrating instead 
on Madison's more pressing concern with the freedoms of religion, 
press, and speech than on the right to bear arms.25 Possibly 
Brant's writing these works when the issue of gun control was not 
at fever pitch has something to do with the lack of coverage of 
this issue.
Good discussions of early American political party 
development can be found in Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., The 
Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of Party Organization, 
1789-1801, and Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System:
The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States.
1780-1840,26 Cunningham charts the voting record of members of 
the House of Representatives on key issues during the First 
Session of the Second Congress and also compares members' voting 
patterns with James Madison's voting record. Although done 
manually, Cunningham's work is valuable in attempting to chart 
the incipient shift toward partisan politics.27 Another work
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that provides insight into the rise of political parties is 
Joseph Charles's The Origins of the American Party System: Three 
Essays. Charles attempts to analyze the personal characteristics 
which motivated Hamilton's quest for power.28
Of the articles dealing with military issues during the 
Federalist period, the best is Frederick Bernays Wiener's "The 
Militia Clause of the Constitution," which summarizes the history 
of the militia from post-Revolutionary days to its incarnation as 
the National Guard at the turn of the twentieth century.29 Wiener 
examines the legal problems involved in the federal use of state 
troops, noting that the "Calling Forth Act" was implemented only 
once, during the Whiskey Rebellion, before being superseded in 
1795 by legislation that did not oblige the President to rely 
upon notification from a particular official before using state 
troops to quell rebellion.30
Another article, more general in scope but interesting as 
philosophical background of the period, is Marshall Smelser's 
"The Federalist Period as an Age of Passion."31 Smelser debunks 
the notion that the principal figures of the times were the 
wholly rational marble gods they are often pictured as today. 
Smelser makes a case that "the political activity of the 
Federalist period was strongly influenced by the passions of 
hate, anger, and fear."32
In addition to using the standard source material mentioned 
above, I have also used quantitative analysis in examining the 
defense-related business of the Second Congress. This 
quantitative analysis takes the form of computerized roll-call 
research, using Rice-Beyle cluster-bloc analysis to explore
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groupings of congressmen who voted together. The advantage of 
the Rice-Beyle method of analysis is that, by looking at the 
voting record of congressmen in a particular Congress, it ensures 
a place of importance for those obscure members who did not 
appear in the Annals of Congress with the regularity of a man 
like Madison. Unlike the standard methods of research, which 
often emphasize those public figures who made the most noise, 
cluster-bloc analysis permits the weight of numbers to be 
accounted for in examining the history of a particular congress.
For my examination of the defense-related roll calls of the 
Second Congress, Rice-Beyle cluster-bloc analysis served its 
purpose well. This method compares the voting record of each 
member with that of every other member. The amount of similarity 
in voting behavior appears in sets of pair-wise combinations that 
are plotted on a matrix as well as in column percentages of 
agreement.33 For this Congress, I have chosen the standard 
seventy percent as the level of agreement between members 
necessary to belong to a certain bloc. To be a member of that 
bloc's fringe, a congressman must have voted with at least fifty 
percent of that bloc's members, at a minimum of seventy percent 
of the time.
The Second Congress, 1791-1793, set many precedents in the 
fields of government finance, foreign affairs, and in the conduct 
of the nation's military policy. With the clamor for and against 
military action on the frontier, and the problem of how to 
integrate the country's militia forces into the national defense 
establishment, some legislation on these problems was inevitable. 
The Frontier Bill, which enlarged the regular army by three
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regiments for action against Indian tribes, was the consequence 
of the first problem mentioned. The Uniform Militia Act of 1792, 
which provided for a nominally codified system of state militia 
throughout the country, was the eventual product of the latter 
concern. Therefore, for my roll call analysis, I chose the 
eleven defense-related votes which were most important to these 
issues. I split these eleven roll calls into two groups for 
analysis. Six roll calls dealt with votes on the militia issue, 
while the other five concerned a stronger, more expensive 
frontier army. These roll calls are discussed in Appendix A.
The results of Rice-Beyle cluster-bloc analysis of the votes 
mentioned produced somewhat smaller blocs of members than I had 
originally hoped. For one thing, the Second Congress consisted 
of a maximum of seventy-two members, seven of whom were excluded 
from analysis in the Frontier and Militia groupings due to an 
insufficient voting record on these issues. This brings the 
members under consideration down to sixty-five, not a huge number 
of congressmen. Also, and perhaps most importantly, the era of 
high party development had not yet come to fruition in the 
country during this time. Congressmen were not yet in the 
lockstep of voting like automatons according to the dictates of 
their party leaders, as they would be by the end of the 1790s.
Congressmen were more likely at this time to vote according 
to their personal beliefs or sectional interests than toe a party 
line. Rudolf M. Bell, who has analyzed voting patterns of the 
early Congresses, also makes this observation.34 Despite the 
relatively small number of members in the Second Congress, it 
still produced a voting bloc of sixteen members who voted
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consistently in support of the administration's militia policies 
These were regularly opposed by a bloc of ten members who hailed 
largely from Virginia and North Carolina. The existence of such 
groupings, even in a period of such low party development, 
illustrates the utility of Rice-Beyle cluster-bloc analysis.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE MILITARY SETTING FOR CONGRESS
To understand why the Second Congress passed the Uniform 
Militia Act of 1792 we must first examine the background in which 
the legislators operated. To pacify the tribes on the nation's 
northwest frontier, President Washington sent former 
Revolutionary War general and then Governor of the Northwest 
Territory Arthur St. Clair into what is now Indiana to 
demonstrate the nation's military power. St. Clair, however, had 
a poorly trained and equipped force that numbered only about 1400 
men, many of whom had no practical experience in soldiering. The 
army sent against the Indians was too hastily gathered to receive 
proper discipline and training, and departed far too late in the 
season to mount an effective campaign. Also, the militia who 
participated in the campaign were by and large not accustomed to 
an extended campaign, and the federal troops hastily recruited 
were not paid much more than a survival wage. As a result, 
morale and discipline on the march were constant problems. On 
November 4, 1791, General St. Clair's forces on the western 
frontier were completely routed by a coalition of Indian tribes.1 
The stunning defeat of the bulk of United States land forces in 
existence at that time aroused indignation and astonishment among 
congressmen and ordinary citizens alike. How had such a thing 
happened? What could be done to prevent a reoccurrence?2
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With the conclusion of the American Revolution in 1783 the 
fledgling United States of America was faced with the 
administration of thousands of square miles of the newly acquired 
Northwest Territory. This land had been acquired by the British 
from the French at the end of the French and Indian War in 1763 
and had in turn passed into the control of the Americans in 1783 
as part of the peace settlement in the Treaty of Paris between 
Great Britain and America. French and British administration of 
these lands had differed significantly from what was to be the 
effective policy of the United States. Rather than the desultory 
white intrusion into Indian lands by trappers and traders that 
characterized the British and French approach, the Americans 
began to advance with the intent of permanently settling in what 
were Indian hunting areas. The Indians of these areas were not 
slow to realize the consequences of such encroachments, and 
sought to halt the loss of their way of life. From the friction 
arising from the relentless enlargement of American possessions 
was to come a situation requiring military and political 
decisions. The new nation could not advance unimpeded through 
Indian territory.
The British and French had always sought to avoid 
unnecessary intrusion into Indian affairs, a largess due mainly 
to their desire to preserve the existing fur trade with the 
tribes. While the fur trade was also important to the newly 
land-rich United States, just as important were the settlement 
and sale of these new lands. Proceeds from the sale of the 
public domain would be useful in establishing the new republic on 
a sound financial basis. However, as William H. Guthman remarks,
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"Unfortunately, this same land was the hunting ground of the 
powerful Western Confederacy of Indian tribes, including the 
Wyandots, Miamis, Shawnees, Delawares, Ottawas, Chippewas, and 
Potawatomi."3
With the advance of hordes of settlers both west and south, 
inevitable conflicts with the native peoples began to develop. 
Newspapers of the day gave lurid accounts of frontier settlers 
massacred by the "insatiable rovers of the wilderness."4 The 
overextended regular army on the frontier could not possibly 
cover the broad range of territory it was now responsible for 
protecting. Despite Secretary of War Knox's policy of 
conciliation with the Indian tribes, and the army's attempts to 
curtail the avalanche of squatters into the territories, tension 
continued to increase on the frontier. Particularly in the 
Northwest and in Kentucky, the sheer volume of white settlers 
served to make frontier violence a certainty; this was especially 
likely because the Indian tribes native to those regions were 
more aggressive in protecting their lands than those elsewhere.5
With a flood of reports of frontier atrocities before 
Congress, Knox felt compelled to take offensive action against 
the Northwest tribes.6 Accordingly, in September 1790 General 
Josiah Harmar mounted an expedition against the Miami villages in 
Ohio with a mixed force of 1,133 militia and 320 regulars. The 
goal of the expedition was to destroy the Indian towns on the 
Maumee as well as to deal a crushing blow to the Indian will to 
wage war on the frontier. Unfortunately, the poor performance of 
the Kentucky and Pennsylvania militia during the campaign, 
coupled with an inopportune division of the troops by Harmar
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himself, doomed the expedition to failure. With losses of 75 
regulars killed and 3 wounded, and 108 dead militia and 28 
wounded, Harmar's defeat was so stunning that Knox ordered a 
board of inquiry.7 Harmar was eventually exonerated by the 
board. His defense, which the board clearly accepted, was based 
on the alleged cowardly performance of the militia under his 
command.8 However, Michael S. Warner makes the point that 
although the militia accompanying Harmar on his campaign were 
generally decrepit in appearance and equipment, the heavy 
casualties suffered by them during some of the campaign's most 
severe fighting belies their usual designation as cowards.
All in all, the ultimate result of Harmar's campaign was the 
reverse of what had been intended. Rather than overawing the 
Indian tribes of the Northwest, this demonstration of the 
apparent weakness and ineptitude of the United States military 
served to embolden the Indians and made the frontier an even more 
frightening place to reside for those bold enough to venture 
there. Indeed, when the tribes of the Western Confederacy saw 
what had been intended by the United States military, they were 
even less inclined to make peace with the whites than before.9
The resort to military expeditions to force the Indians into 
submission was by no means unopposed in the public forums of the 
day. Wrote one impassioned reader to the Boston Gazette in 
September 1791:
I contend the Indians are right in defending their 
lands, and committing depredations on inhabitants that use 
them with savage barbarity. It is owing to the 
ill-treatment they have received from the settlers, that the 
present hostilities have commenced. Indians have been 
murdered with impunity in the very face of treaties, by the 
most abandoned of villains, and no jury could be found 
virtuous enough to convict the monsters.10
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Later that same year a correspondent noted in the same newspaper 
that "Indians must have some provocation to those acts of 
barbarity, and were those complaints published and circulated 
among us, perhaps their conduct might appear more like 
retaliation, than a mere wanton disposition to murder and 
plunder."u A writer in the Philadelphia General Advertiser 
expressed the opinion in early 1792 that a war with the Indians 
was not only immoral, but expensive and impractical as well. 
Besides warning of the sacrifice of public credit, this writer 
went on to warn that "above all we have like the British 
attempted with hired troops to subdue a people who are determined 
to be free, are animated with revenge, and convinced of the 
justice of their cause; and no doubt from these considerations 
are determined to defend themselves to the last extremity.''12
An interesting contributor to early American newspapers at 
this time was the Indian peace chief Cornplanter, or Cornplant, 
as some called him. In published letters to the governor of 
Pennsylvania, Cornplanter countered talk "of the robberies and 
murders committed by the Indians" by relating how his own people 
were robbed by white men on several occasions.13 One of his more 
notable correspondences came with President Washington himself, 
who replied that the murders of Indians by whites would be 
punished, Indian land would be protected, and treaties would be 
honored. This would prove difficult without adequate military 
force to control not only Indians, but the frontiersmen as 
well--as the story of Indian relations over the next hundred 
years was to prove. Moreover, Washington went on to say that the 
Miami tribes would be forced by U. S. troops to ensure peace,
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which, considering the failure of the St. Clair and Harnar 
expeditions, must have seemed doubtful to Cornplanter. To 
Cornplanter's insistence that the Indian chiefs who signed the 
Treaty of Ft. Stanwix (a treaty concluded with the Five Nations 
at the end of the Revolution) were signing away such a huge tract 
of land, Washington firmly asserted that all parties involved in 
the treaty knew exactly what they were doing at the time. With 
Washington's assurances of fair dealing in the future,
Cornplanter and his fellow Seneca chiefs returned in peace to 
their homes.14
However, one official who had expressed grave reservations 
about the country's direction in Indian matters was Henry Knox 
himself. In a report to President Washington dated June 15,
1789, long before the military disasters, Knox warned that:
It is highly probable, that by a conciliatory system, 
the expense of managing the said Indians, and attaching them 
to the United States for the next ensuing period of fifty 
years, may, on an average, cost 15,000 dollars annually.
A system of coercion and oppression, pursued from time 
to time, for the same period, as the convenience of the 
United States might dictate, would probably amount to a much 
greater sum of money; but the blood and injustice which 
would stain the character of the nation, would be beyond all 
pecuniary calculation.15
While troubled by the notion of the United States becoming a 
nation of aggressive land-grabbers, Knox did not rule out the 
acquisition of Indian lands altogether:
The Indians, being the prior occupants, possess the 
right of the soil. It cannot be taken from them unless by 
their free consent, or by the right of conquest in case of a 
just war. To dispossess them on any other principle, would 
be a gross violation of the fundamental laws of nature, and 
of that distributive justice which is the glory of a 
nation.16
The irony of the new republic waging an apparent war of 
conquest against the native Americans was not lost on everyone.
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To some it seemed that the troubles in the Indian country- 
provided an excuse for national expansion, even a cover for 
imperialistic schemes on the British plan. In February 1792 "An 
Observer" sent the Philadelphia General Advertiser these dire 
comments:
Could the late Congress when they commenced this war, 
like the patriotic Congress of 1775, with confidence appeal 
to the Ruler of the Universe for the purity of their 
intention, and the avarice and ambition of their enemies,
No: they have reversed the picture, and by becoming
oppressors, have obliged their adversaries to be the 
assertors of liberty; they have sent troops into the Indian 
country, to commit depredations, worse perhaps than the 
British committed in this country; and in so doing they have 
given occasion to the friends of freedom, in every quarter 
of the globe, to lament that the very people, who were the 
first to defend their own rights, and establish equal 
liberty, have been among the first to invade the rights of 
others.17
During President Washington's address to the opening session 
of the Second Congress on October 25, 1791, he enumerated several 
issues faced by the previous session of Congress. In 
Washington's words: "Among the most important of these is the 
defense and security of the western frontiers."18 After briefly 
noting the failure of treaties in pacifying all Indian tribes, 
Washington revealed that "Offensive operations have therefore 
been directed, to be conducted, however, as consistently as 
possible with the dictates of humanity. Some of these have been 
crowned with full success, and others are yet depending fsicl . 1,19 
Ironically, Washington made this last statement only two weeks 
before the St. Clair disaster on the frontier.
Before addressing other problems then at hand for the new 
Congress, such as roads, the post office, the mint, and weights 
and measures, Washington suggested a detailed solution to the 
Indian problem:
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It is sincerely to be desired, that all need of 
coercion in future may cease; and that an intimate 
intercourse may succeed, calculated to advance the happiness 
of the Indians, and to attach them firmly to the United 
States.
In order to do this, it seems necessary--
That they should experience the benefits of an 
impartial disposition of justice.
That the mode of alienating their lands, the main 
source of discontent and war, should be so defined and 
regulated as to obviate imposition, and, as far as may be 
practicable, controversy concerning the reality and extent 
of the alienations which are made.
That commerce with them should be promoted under 
regulations tending to secure an equitable deportment 
towards them, and that such rational experiments should be 
made, for imparting to them the blessings of civilization, 
as may from time to time suit their condition.20
Washington concluded on the Indian subject with this bit of
eighteenth-century reasoning:
A system corresponding with the mild principles of 
religion and philanthropy towards an unenlightened race of 
men, whose happiness materially depends on the conduct of 
the United States, would be as honorable to the national 
character as conformable to the dictates of sound policy.21
In reply to the President's address, a committee of the
Second Congress, headed by James Madison, agreed in particular
with his statements concerning "the safety of our Western
frontiers, in which the lives and repose of so many of our
fellow-citizens are involved."22 Madison and the others also
praised the "gallantry and good conduct of the militia" whose
service on the frontier was "an honorable confirmation of the
efficacy of that precious resource of a free State." In briefly
praising the efforts of General Charles Scott and his Kentucky
militia, Washington, during his address to Congress, had
recognized the virtues of the militia, even as the fate of St.
Clair's expedition was still unknown. He thereby provided
opponents of a standing army, such as Madison, an opportunity to
make a brief case for the virtues of the militia without
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unnecessarily embarrassing the President. Every member of 
Congress knew of the failure of Harmar the year before, although 
the fate of St. Clair's army was still pending. The members of 
the reply committee went on to express hopes for the success of 
the new expedition, and wished that it would "leave the United 
States free to pursue the most benevolent policy towards the 
unhappy and deluded race of people in our neighborhood."23
The expedition of Brigadier General Charles Scott to which 
both Washington and Madison referred proved an interesting 
exception to the generally unsuccessful use of militia against 
the Wabash Indians that preceded and followed it. Whereas Harmar 
and St. Clair lived to regret the employment of militia against 
the western tribes, Scott and James Wilkinson enjoyed successful 
raids against these Indians because of superior tactics and more 
careful selection of the troops involved. After a peace mission 
by Thomas Procter had met predictable failure, Knox instructed 
Scott to make two raids on the Indian towns on the Wea River. 
Scott's force was expected to intimidate the Indians into a 
peaceful settlement by a show of force.24
Before setting out on his mission, General Scott carefully 
chose 750 Kentucky horsemen from the volunteer militia available. 
These men were experienced Indian fighters and were accustomed to 
the hardships of the wilderness, as opposed to the raw recruits 
of the Harmar and St. Clair campaigns. Moving swiftly and 
changing direction often in order to avoid detection or ambush by 
his Indian adversaries, Scott and his men struck deep into the 
Wabash territory. Utilizing hit-and-run tactics they had 
borrowed from the Indians themselves, Scott's men inflicted
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casualties of thirty-two killed while sustaining only five 
wounded of their own. Although the crops and villages they burned 
were not enough incentive for the Indians to abandon frontier 
raids, Scott's men had shown that it was possible for a 
fast-moving volunteer force to advance with success into Indian 
territory and return intact. A similar expedition led by 
Lieutenant-Colonel-Commandant Wilkinson achieved lesser results, 
but still came away from the Wabash area with its unit integrity 
complete.25 After his own campaign's conclusion, Scott made the 
telling observation of the character of the men involved in this 
style of fighting, remarking that "no act of inhumanity has 
marked the conduct of the volunteers of Kentucky on this 
occasion; even the inveterate habit of scalping the dead has 
ceased to influence."26
These small campaigns seemed to indicate that militia could 
provide an adequate force for the new republic, but Scott and 
Wilkinson's campaigns were to be the last successes the militia 
forces of the United States enjoyed for some time. Preparations 
were hastily underway for the St. Clair campaign, which was 
intended to overawe the Indians and show them the uselessness of 
resisting the might of the United States.27 Rather than a 
small-scale raid on the Indian villages, this expedition was to 
be "a full-scale invasion north from Cincinnati, so large and so 
powerful an army that it could overpower any combination of 
Indians" even if assisted by the British.28 Unfortunately, the 
administration delayed action on the expedition so far into the 
year that supplies were lacking, the men were not adequately
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trained, and most importantly, the men lacked the discipline to 
operate as a cohesive unit.29
The rush to assemble St. Clair's force led to the 
administration's reluctant decision to use militia during the 
campaign. Despite misgivings generated by the lackluster 
performance of militia during the Harmar campaign, and mitigated 
by the successes of Scott and Wilkinson, the administration was 
so pressed by considerations of time and money that militia had 
to be utilized to flesh out the forces employed. In addition to 
militia, a new type of soldier, the levy, was to be used. Levies 
were a compromise between federal troops and state militia. They 
were volunteers officered and under the power of the national 
government who were to serve for the duration of the campaign.30 
According to Kohn, "for a campaign against the Indians in 1791, 
levies revealed the administration's timidity, its 
underestimation of the enemy, and its arrogance and 
overconfidence. Militarily, the levies turned out to be a 
disaster. "31
As the army blundered through the wilderness, without 
adequate knowledge of the terrain, and split into its three 
components of regulars, militia, and levies, the Wabash Indians 
and their allies simply bided their time until an opportunity for 
attack presented itself. The men suffered from want of 
provisions and discipline problems were rampant. Wrote one 
miserable soldier on the march: "The evil fates seem to have 
pursued us; may they in future be auspicious."32
On October 31, 1791, a number of militia deserted, with the 
result that the force was further weakened when the First
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Regiment of regulars was detached to chase them. According to 
one bitter participant in the rout by the Indians that followed:
"[It was a] fortunate circumstance that they were detached; for, 
had they been there, they would only have served to swell the 
numbers of the slain, and made the sacrifice on our part 
greater."33 When the Indians finally attacked on November 4,
1791, the militia forces broke and ran immediately, leaving the 
regular troops to close the gaps in the ranks. For three hours 
the army fought in reasonable order until finally, after 
suffering around 900 casualties, the badly mauled United States 
Army began a retreat which quickly degenerated into a rout.34
During the frantic race for the safety of their fort on the 
Ohio River, many of the wounded and less fleet-footed of the 
soldiers were left behind, including fifty female camp followers 
accompanying the expedition. Newspapers of the day carried 
several lurid, alleged first-hand accounts of the atrocities that 
befell those who could not keep pace with their comrades, 
although many of these can perhaps be attributed to newspaper 
sensationalism.35 St. Clair himself admitted later that the 
conclusion of the army's encounter with the Wabash Indians was 
less than satisfactory. "It was, in fact, a flight," St. Clair 
sadly acknowledged to President Washington.36
Reaction to the crushing defeat was one of shock. President 
Washington reportedly exploded with rage when informed of St. 
Clair's apparent carelessness and lack of caution. To Washington 
especially, the comparison to Braddock's defeat many years before 
struck home.37 Similar reactions appeared in newspapers around 
the country. Several participants in the campaign wrote letters
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detailing their shock and horror at what they had seen. A 
Captain John H. Buell wrote from Fort Washington (present-day 
Cincinnati): "I . . .am alive and well; but many of our friends 
have lately exchanged worlds. Such a total defeat has never 
happened in this country since Braddock's, and I presume that was 
not equal."38 Congressman Elias Boudinot's response was typical: 
"It is on the whole a most mortifying and perplexing affair, and 
I am at a loss to know, what steps are proper to retrieve it.
Our Sessions will be prolonged greatly by so untoward a 
Circumstance, as I expect it will give rise to great debates."39
Stunned by the failure of St. Clair's efforts, the 
Washington administration began to reexamine both its Indian 
policy and military policy. Influenced by the dismal performance 
of the various militia involved in the Harmar and St. Clair 
campaigns, Henry Knox began to lean toward the use of regular 
troops as opposed to militia when fighting Indians, despite the 
successes of the smaller campaigns under Scott and Wilkinson.
With the tribes now emboldened by their easy victories over the 
U. S. forces under Harmar and St. Clair, further peace 
initiatives seemed useless. Military force would be the primary 
means of dealing with the hostile tribes, and regular soldiers, 
"disciplined," "obedient," and "proud," would be the most 
effective agents of that policy.40 Some of the misgivings Knox 
had expressed to President Washington in 1789 had been prophetic. 
Losing campaigns was expensive.
To pursue the administration goal of enlarging the federal 
army, Washington and Knox presented to Congress a plan to 
increase the existing army by three regiments, which would bring
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the overall strength of the army to five regiments. This bill 
came to be called the "Five Regiment Bill," or the "Frontier 
Bill," since its purpose was to bring security and safety to the 
frontier settlements. The expense of the bill (estimated at one 
million dollars per year) was to be hotly debated in Congress.41
Opponents of a "standing army" saw in this bill a chance for 
the government to overawe not just the Indians it was allegedly 
intended to subdue, but the average citizen as well. During this 
debate in Congress these opponents, although not quoted by name 
in the Annals, pointed out that many of the difficulties that 
prompted a military expedition in the first place were brought on 
by the greed and rapacity of the white settlers on the frontier. 
Additionally, they emphasized the superiority of militia familiar 
with Indian tactics as opposed to regulars recruited from cities, 
"terrified at the idea of savage barbarity, which they have ever 
been taught to reflect on with horror." The example of General 
Scott's successful expedition against the Wabash tribes, using 
militia exclusively, was referred to in defense of the military 
status quo.42
The huge expense of a greatly expanding army, "especially at 
the present moment, when there is scarcely a dollar in the 
Treasury,■ was also emphasized during the debate on the Frontier 
Bill, and opponents hailed the alleged extravagance as a sign to 
the nation's enemies that the United States was pursuing a policy 
of aggression toward its neighbors, particularly Canada.
Opponents of the bill also echoed the sentiments prevalent in the 
press that the war was unjust and an intrusion into lands 
justifiably defended by their native inhabitants.43
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Proponents of the bill argued that regular forces, with 
their greater discipline and stamina for combat, would ultimately 
prove the superior form of military force against the Indians.
The merits of properly handled militia against Indians were 
acknowledged by some advocates of the Frontier Bill, but they 
claimed that with adequate training, regulars could prove their 
equal or better in a contest with the Indians. Noted one 
supporter of the Frontier Bill:
Every man who has ever seen militia in the field, 
cannot but know that a very trifling disaster, or a slight 
cause of discontent, is sufficient to make them disband and 
forget all subordination, so far as even to neglect the 
means of self-defence; whereas regular troops, under proper 
discipline, and acting with greater steadiness and concert, 
are much more to be depended on, especially when the object 
of attack is distant, and great fatigue is to be 
undergone.44
Foes of the militia managed to place opponents of a standing 
army in the uncomfortable position of appearing to contravene the 
interests of their constituents with the following call for 
immediate action on the Frontier Bill:
No dependence can therefore be placed on militia under 
any laws now existing. There is, indeed, a general militia 
law now before the House; but if it ever passes, it 
certainly cannot be passed in due season to answer the 
purpose of providing for the immediate defense of the 
frontier. Regular troops must be raised, or nothing 
effectual can be done; and if to avoid the expense we refuse 
the only aid that may prove of any real service, we render 
ourselves responsible for the consequences of this 
parsimonious policy, which may be attended with the ruin and 
destruction of our fellow-citizens in the Western country.45
Thus, defenders of the principle of a free, non-threatening
state militia were faced with the dilemma of having to yield to
the urgent necessity of defending their state's frontiers with
the most efficient, albeit expensive, military force available at
the time, or else supporting the type of force that recent
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experience had indicated to be inadequate--even dangerous. Even 
James Madison, one of those most suspicious of standing armies, 
had to place his constituents' immediate interests above his 
fears. Madison voted for the Frontier Bill. The bill passed the 
House on February 1, 1792, by a vote of 29 to 19.46
Although the exigencies of the Indian crisis weighed heavily 
on the congressmen who dealt with the Frontier Bill, the concept 
of a healthy and active militia for the defense of the community 
was still a significant factor for most of the legislators 
present in the Second Congress. As we will see, the idea of a 
vital militia stretched far back in the consciousness of early 
America.
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CHAPTER THREE: MILITIA PRECEDENTS
When the Second Congress met to consider passage of the 
Uniform Militia Act, it was not operating in an intellectual or 
historical void. The history of militia in both England and 
colonial America was both long and extensive, and quite familiar 
to most of the congressmen present, several of whom had had 
first-hand experience with militia. To understand the attitudes 
at work in the Second Congress when the Uniform Militia Act of 
1792 was being considered, we must look at the English and 
colonial precedents.
Even in the scattered records that survive from the 
Anglo-Saxon period of English history, there is often mention of 
the fyrd, or host. The fyrd was a component of what modern 
historians call the trinoda necessitas, a threefold obligation 
incumbent on freeholders of that time. The other two portions of 
this system included constructing bridges (bryc-geweorc), and 
maintenance and construction of fortresses (burhbot). Although 
ownership of property required service in the fyrd, the sense of 
military obligation extended to other social classes of 
Anglo-Saxon times as well. Evidence of this appears in records 
of forfeiture of money or personal property by those failing to 
appear for duty in the fyrd.1
According to Michael Powicke, the fyrd "was from an early 
date the king's army, both in allegiance and leadership."2 At
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the borough level the host was strictly of a defensive nature, 
but mounted warriors also comprised an important constituent of 
the fyrd. It was around these men, primarily thegns, or 
retainers, that the followings of earls and royal reeves 
collected. Eventually the elite huscarles, a force of mounted 
troops, were added to the royal force, and it was this 
combination of common militia and select forces that prevailed 
until the Battle of Hastings.3 With the Norman Conquest, the 
feudal levy was introduced. Service in the feudal levy was 
distinguished from the general levy (which was still in effect) 
by tenure of land under the king as feudal lord. In both systems 
one could still avoid actual service in the levy by payment or by 
hiring a substitute to serve in one's stead. Another important 
distinction between the feudal and general levy was that service 
in the general levy precluded overseas duty, whereas members of 
the feudal levy were subject to the whims of the king when it 
came to where they might end up fighting.4
By the eighteen century the English militia had evolved into 
a system whereby each county had a "lord lieutenant" responsible 
for the muster and training of the militia. The lieutenant was 
accountable to the crown for the readiness of the men, and a 
system of fines was in effect for non-compliance with militia 
rules. Significantly, the English Militia Law of 1757 provided 
that "the militia shall not, on any occasion, be compelled to go 
out of the kingdom."5 By the middle of the eighteenth century, 
then, the English military had divided into two forces: a large, 
professional, regular army primarily for colonial and
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expeditionary duties, and a carefully regulated militia intended 
for purely domestic and defensive purposes.
In colonial America, the earliest settlers in Massachusetts 
and Virginia adopted militia systems to defend themselves from 
the Indian threat, and these systems were altered from the 
English model to fit the circumstances of the colonial 
environment.6 Regarding the Jamestown settlement in particular, 
William L. Shea has said:
The ancient concept of the community in arms, a militia 
composed of all adult males who were expected to take up 
arms whenever danger threatened, was initially more 
appropriate to that society than the current English notion 
of a smallish peacekeeping militia. It is perhaps not 
overly romantic to say that a kind of hybrid Anglo-American 
fvrd existed for a brief time on the shores of Chesapeake 
Bay.7
As the colonies grew, the militia of each developed 
according to the defensive needs of that particular colony. In 
time, those colonies regularly challenged by frontier 
difficulties seemed to develop more efficient militia than 
others. According to John Shy, by the mid-point of the 
eighteenth century only New England had a vital, effective 
militia system, while the militias of Virginia, New York, South 
Carolina, and Georgia had either atrophied or become apathetic.8 
As a result of general colonial indifference to events outside 
each colony's area, the Seven Years War was fought largely with 
regular forces and volunteers from the respective colonies, 
rather than with militia.9
After the immediate threat of Indian attack subsided in the 
colonies, the militia became something of a social club in some 
areas, and a bastion of the middle class. In fact, the burden of 
actual combat during the period preceding the American Revolution
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befell those who were indigent or unable to find other
employment.10 According to Martin and Lender:
Over time the militia became the exclusive province of free, 
white, propertied males, usually between the ages of 16 and 
60. Thus Indians, slaves, free blacks, indentured servants, 
apprentices, and indigents came to be excluded from militia 
service. In actuality, a primary function of the militia 
turned out to be protecting the propertied and the 
privileged in colonial society from the unpropertied and 
unprivileged.11
The connection between property and militia service is a 
strong one. When the militia members felt that their personal 
property was in danger of being despoiled or plundered, they 
could fight with determination, as they did at Lexington and 
Concord. When the threat was distant or not immediately 
apparent, they could be disinterested.12 As Martin and Lender put 
it: "In actuality, the military component of the concept of
citizenship in late colonial America extended as far as the outer 
limits of property holding went."13
Despite the provincial outlook of many of the militia, the 
popular conception endured of the selfless citizen-soldier who 
willingly faced peril while defending his country. The 
performance of the Virginia backwoodsmen on the Braddock campaign 
is a case in point. Although the efforts of Braddock ended in 
disaster, the prevailing sentiment then and now is that the 
colonials were naturally more talented fighters than the redcoats 
in the campaign. The tactical errors of the British commander 
provided ammunition to an already existing colonial bias toward 
the supposedly noble militia.14 The efforts of the militia army 
at Breed's (or Bunker) Hill provided further fuel for those 
proponents of the militia who did not comprehend the rigors of a 
protracted campaign. It was one thing to fight bravely from
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entrenched fortifications, as at Bunker Hill, but quite another 
to face bayonet-equipped regular troops in open field fighting.15
At the onset of the Revolution, the notion of the militia's 
moral superiority to regular troops was in common vogue in the 
colonies. Professional troops were thought to be fighting for 
spoil and plunder, decidedly ignoble goals, while the militia was 
perceived as defending hearth and home. As Don Higginbotham puts 
it:
The roots of this American militia ethos were imported from 
England at a time when the Stuart monarchy was turning from 
a centuries-old militia system to professional soldiers as 
its first line of defense. Certain seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century British writers, who kept alive a radical 
Whig tradition in the parent kingdom and whose works were 
widely disseminated in America, glorified an English militia 
that had not performed effectively in modern times and 
exaggerated the benefits of scarcely trained yeomen in arms 
because of their dislike and fear of salaried, full-time 
forces.16
Probably the most influential seventeenth-century writer on 
the virtue of the citizen soldier was James Harrington. 
Harrington's Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), says Lawrence Delbert 
Cress, "provides the starting point for understanding the 
assumptions behind the anti-standing army rhetoric that helped 
shape American perceptions of the military's relationship to the 
civil constitution."17 In Harrington's imaginary world, property 
was the key to citizenship. Without it, one could neither vote 
nor bear arms. Military and political power merged in this 
system, as those who held the balance of property would control 
society itself.18
Analyzing Harrington's philosophy, J. G. A. Pocock is in 
substantial agreement with Cress on this point, noting that 
"Harrington's citizen may or may not be an entrepreneur, but he
is primarily a freeholder."19 More important, as Pocock points 
out:
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The right to bear arms, and the propertied independence 
enabling one to provide one's own, become the tests of 
citizenship in Harrington's England as they had been in 
Athens or Rome. County assemblies are at once assemblies of 
the electorate and musters of the militia; the citizens are 
exercising by their ballots the freedom they muster in their 
arms, and casting their votes in the course of their 
military drill.20
Although the radical Whig thinkers rejected Harrington's
idea that in a system such as his the landed citizens were immune
from military abuses, they did adopt his idea of "that concept or
bogey of the standing army which was to figure so prominently
among the political ideas of the next century."21 The radical
Whigs, through their writings, kept emphasizing the evils of a
"hired mercenary force" that could imperil the stability of
English government. In Cress's words:
A militia offered the constitutionally safe means of 
providing for the national defense. A revitalized militia 
would return the nation's defense to its most 
interested--that is, propertied--citizens, reinstating the 
balance between citizens and government and removing the 
tyrannical threat of the monarchy.22
The threat to civil liberties posed by a standing army
recurs often in the political literature of the seventeenth
century. Pocock summarized the Country (as opposed to Court, or
town) view of English politics:
The essence of the standing army is its long-service 
professionalism, which is what makes it a sinister interest 
and a potential uncontrolled branch of government. But 
there is an ancient institution known as the militia, 
whereby the public defense is exercised directly by the 
independent proprietors appearing in their arms at their own 
charge. If the armed force of the nation is embodied only 
in this form, there can be no threat to public liberty or 
the public purse; and the proprietor's liberty is guaranteed 
as much by his right to be the sole fighter in his own 
defense as by his ultimate right to cast a vote in his own 
government. To defend the militia against a standing army
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is the same thing as to defend Parliament against 
corruption.23
What may be most significant about the radical Whig ideas 
and political theories is the availability of their literature to 
the colonial leaders of America. According to Cress, many of the 
political tracts written by radical Whigs found their way into 
the libraries of most of the men who would come to be regarded as 
the Founding Fathers. This was the result in part of the efforts 
of the radical Whig propagandist Thomas Hollis. The pro-army 
literature of Adam Smith, however, received considerably less 
dissemination in the colonies.24
One of the more prominent Virginians influenced by Whig 
philosophy on standing armies was George Mason. Speaking at the 
Virginia Convention in 1788, Mason echoed Whig thinking when he 
urged his colleagues: "Recollect the history of most nations of 
the world— what havoc, desolation, and destruction, have been 
perpetrated by standing armies!"25 Mason went on to express the 
standard corollary to this notion, that of a virtuous militia 
which would obviate the hazards and corruption of a regular 
army.26
Any who doubted the danger of having a standing army in the 
community's midst had to look no further than the Boston area, 
where the perception of a standing army as the tool of a corrupt 
ministry was reinforced by the so-called Boston Massacre of 1770. 
Although the affair was provoked in part by the actions of the 
townspeople, the incident served to fan the flames of those who 
felt the very presence of regular troops in the community was in 
some way a plan to enslave the populace.27
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After the Revolution, the fear of a standing army retained 
an immediacy in the thought of men of the Revolution, even to the 
point that the bitter lessons of the war regarding the 
inconsistency of the state militia were blissfully ignored. In 
the optimistic atmosphere that followed the Revolution, "belief 
in citizen-soldiers became inextricably intertwined with an 
undying faith in the martial prowess of untrained men led by 
political generals."28 This attitude was still quite strong in 
the 1790s and is reflected in the debates over the military 
policy of the time.
While pushing for ratification of the Constitution, James 
Madison voiced a concern common to people of the era, when he 
spoke of the dangers of military unpreparedness, and excessive 
preparedness:
The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the 
undisciplined valour of all other nations, and rendered her 
the mistress of the world. Nor the less true is it, that 
the liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her 
military triumphs; and that the liberties of Europe, as far 
as they ever existed, have, with few exceptions, been the 
price of her military establishments. A standing force 
therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a 
necessary, provision. On the smallest scale it has its 
inconveniences. On an extensive scale its consequences may 
be fatal. On any scale it is an object of laudable 
circumspection and precaution.29
Madison, then, while certainly no admirer of a standing 
army, acknowledged that requirements could arise that would 
require a regular military establishment, but warned that it 
should be watched closely. Besides, said Madison, "America 
united, with a handful of troops, or without a single soldier, 
exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign ambition than 
America disunited, with a hundred thousand veterans ready for 
combat."30 As things turned out, Madison got much of what he
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wished in the Constitution, as far as things military. As 
Frederick B. Wiener puts it:
The Constitution as adopted reflected a fear of standing 
armies. One was authorized, but the militia was not 
abolished. It was to be organized, armed, and disciplined 
by Congress, but, except when in federal service, was to be 
governed by the states. The President was to be 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and of the militia while in 
federal service.31
The fear of a strong central government usurping individual 
rights led to passage of the Bill of Rights in 1791, mainly from 
the efforts of James Madison. The much-ballyhooed Second 
Amendment says: "A well-regulated militia being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 
bear arms shall not be infringed." But, "the 'free State' 
referred to was not the federal government," it was the 
individual states.32
Looking at the Second Amendment objectively in modern times, 
Frederick B. Wiener calls it "substantially a dead letter in the 
face of police power necessities and a recession from the 
frontier conditions which required every citizen to go armed for 
his own defense." Wiener also notes "that the Third Amendment, 
which limits the quartering of soldiers, has yet to be invoked, 
indicates rather forcefully that the fears of the ratifiers were 
not well-founded; they cannot detract, however, from the 
prevalence of views then entertained."33 Here Wiener is hitting 
the nail on the head in the matter of the militia and 
post-Revolutionary attitudes toward civil liberties. What may 
seem an unreasoning paranoia over military domination to someone 
in the twentieth century, probably would have made perfect sense
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to a person who had just seen the conclusion of years of heated 
military conflict.
While the notion of a struggle between good and evil 
embodied by the militia on one hand and a regular army on the 
other hand may seem farfetched to a modern person, the concern 
over the quality of the nation's military readiness by members of 
the Second Congress is apparent from the debates in the Annals. 
Although the past could furnish fuel for both sides of the 
argument over whether militia or regulars were superior, the 
Second Congress had to devise a military system that would best 
serve the immediate needs of a country still unsure of its 
military destiny. As we shall see, the high hopes of many of the 
more militia-oriented congressmen would come to frustration when 
faced with the reality of implementing a national plan for the
militia.
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CHAPTER FOUR: PLANS FOR A MILITIA
The Uniform Militia Act of 1792 as passed by the Second 
Congress bore little resemblance to the plan originally proposed 
by Secretary of War Henry Knox in January 1790. From the plan 
initially set forth by Knox emerged a ramshackle system of 
militia that was barren of enforceable measures. The process by 
which Knox's system of universal military obligation was 
transformed into a piece of "politico-military nostalgia become 
law"1 was a lengthy and interesting one. The First and Second 
Congresses transformed the administration's original plan into an 
almost unrecognizable plan for a national militia.
The plan that Henry Knox submitted to the First Congress was 
not the first suggested plan for an American national militia. 
Both Friedrich von Steuben and Henry Knox had prepared plans 
involving the militia during the years of the Confederation. 
Steuben's plan favored a system of military academies designed to 
create a number of professionally trained officers to both lead 
the regular army and the state militia. Ten percent of the 
graduates of these academies would enter the regular army, with 
the remaining ninety percent heading back to their respective 
state militia to provide a core of leadership for those units.
By this system a cadre of officers trained in the art of war 
would be produced for the young nation, and a comprehensive 
nation-wide manpower defense network would be established.
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Steuben was not of the opinion that every citizen was cut out to 
be a soldier, but felt rather that war was the province of the 
highly-trained and the skillful.2
Washington took the ideas put forth by Steuben and other 
advisors such as Timothy Pickering, Rufus Putnam, Adjutant 
General Edward Hand, and George Clinton, and boiled them down 
into one defense plan he felt suited the particular needs of the 
country at the time. The concept of classing, that is, 
distinguishing between men's militia obligation according to 
their age, was common to Pickering, Steuben, and, of course,
Knox, and Washington also favored such a system. Washington and 
his advisors desired a formula of militia in national defense 
that would involve a select group of militia. These select 
militiamen would be ready to respond at a moment's notice to a 
military crisis. As is usually the case in such matters, the 
hardship of defending the nation would fall to the youngest 
class, in this case those aged eighteen to twenty-five.3
In his 1783 message to Congress known as his "Sentiments on 
a Peace Establishment," Washington wrote that the young not only 
displayed more ardor for military life, but that their removal 
from the general society during a military emergency would be 
less destructive to the social and economic well-being of society 
than would those more advanced in years. Washington also felt 
that the group of militia composed of the youngest members should 
be detached from the general mass of militia for more intense 
training and duty. Interestingly, Washington favored enrolling
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all adult males aged eighteen to fifty, but wanted the select 
corps to be comprised of volunteers amenable to incurring a 
three- to seven-year militia obligation.4
Washington liked Steuben's plan for a system of military 
academies to train the nation's regular and militia officers, 
feeling that this would keep the germ of military science alive 
in the new nation. He believed then (1783) as he did later that 
a small regular army supplemented by a well-trained body of 
militia was the best means of national defense.5 This notion of 
a dependable national militia was the idea behind the Uniform 
Militia Act, even though the act was ultimately unsatisfactory. 
"Military efficiency was critical," concluded Delbert Cress, "but 
in the minds of General Washington and his advisors, the 
principal means to that end remained militia reform."6
When Alexander Hamilton received then army 
commander-in-chief Washington's 1783 plan, he was sitting in the 
Continental Congress as a member of the congressional committee 
working on the peace establishment. On the necessity of a 
national army and the equipment required to arm them, Hamilton 
concurred with Washington. Hamilton advised against the 
construction of national military academies, however, due to the 
lack of money to pay for them at the moment.7 Curiously, though, 
Hamilton came up with the idea of classing men not by their age, 
but by their marital status, with single men to bear the brunt of 
the republic's militia needs. In his plan, single men would need 
to report six times per year for training, while married men 
would have to attend only four. Also, both groups would include 
men as old as 62 fifty, significantly degrading the possible
60
military effectiveness of their units should extended service be 
necessary.8
Over and above Hamilton's two classes of militia, there was 
to be a class of volunteers paid, supplied, and armed by the 
continental government. This group, to number not more than two 
per cent of the militia, were to train every two weeks in 
companies, each month in regiments, and appear in camp for twenty 
days each year. This class, which would differ from a regular 
army only in the lack of day to day training, would resemble a 
reserve component of the army itself rather than the militia.9
Ultimately, plans to bring the militia under national 
control during the Confederation era came to naught because of a 
lack of funding for such massive programs and the old fear of an 
enlarged military establishment. In a nation which had just 
emerged from a lengthy war for independence, many felt that an 
expanded military of any sort in peacetime was dangerous.10 This 
point was driven home to those members of Congress who had to 
flee Philadelphia for Princeton when angry members of the 
Pennsylvania Line arrived in town demanding back pay.11
Unfortunately for Hamilton's peacetime defense plan (which 
overall, favored an expanded regular army), the timing could not 
have been worse. Congress, concerned with the solvency of the 
country and suspicious of plans that would seemingly centralize 
military power, lost any enthusiasm for Hamilton's proposal.12
Fears that the states would be dominated by a consolidated 
national system were not all confined to the small states, as 
evidenced by Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts. Gerry successfully 
opposed Hamilton's plan for a stronger military, noting the
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safety provided by the geographical isolation of the United 
States and the Articles of Confederation's lack of power to raise 
a standing army in time of peace. In addition, Gerry and his 
colleagues were quick to point out that the militia represented 
"the Constitutional and only safe defence of Republican 
governments. 013
With the defeat of Hamilton's peacetime military proposal, 
the next blueprint to appear was Henry Knox's 1786 Plan for the 
General Arrangement of the Militia, which he submitted to 
Congress in response to its request for a military plan that 
would fit the Articles' requirements.14 This plan was the genesis 
of Knox's 1790 proposal, which evolved, in greatly altered form, 
into the Uniform Militia Act of 1792.
As in his 1790 plan, Knox would require the youth of the 
country to form an "advanced corps" of men aged eighteen to 
twenty, who would be subject to camp for a total of forty-two 
days each year for training. In his later plan, which he devised 
in response to President Washington's request for a militia plan, 
Knox would have those of eighteen and nineteen report for thirty 
days annual training, while those twenty years of age would be 
required to attend only the last ten days of camp.15 In both 
plans the youth of the country would be improved by the "camps of 
discipline," where sports that corresponded with war, such as 
swimming, running, and wrestling would be practiced, as well as 
"such other exercises as shall render the body flexible and 
vigorous. "16
After service in the advanced corps, the youth would enter 
the much less active "main corps," which would practice a mere
62
four days each year. The leadership of the main corps was 
expected to come eventually from the highly-trained advanced 
corps, as they matriculated into the older age bracket. The main 
corps was to be comprised of men from twenty-one to forty-five 
years of age.17
Not to be denied their chance at martial glory were the men 
of the "reserved corps," aged forty-six to sixty. Required to 
muster only twice annually for inspection of arms, or "whenever 
the defence of the State may render the measure necessary," the 
reserved corps was to be called out only in dire emergency or to 
free up the advanced corps for more pressing duty.18 Knox noted 
the natural reluctance of the middle-aged to rush to arduous or 
extended military duty, and commented that "Youth is the time for 
the State to avail itself of those services which it has a right 
to demand and by which it is to be invigorated and preserved. 1,19 
Observing that the youth will naturally be swayed by the 
attractions of "military parade," Knox also saw that "the head of 
a family, anxious for its general welfare, and perhaps its 
immediate subsistence, will reluctantly quit his domestic duties 
for any length of time."20
Under Knox's 1786 plan the continental government would 
supply the weapons necessary for the militia, which the soldiers 
would retain at the end of their time in the advanced corps. Any 
mobilization of the national militia would be directed and 
overseen by state officials, although service during national 
emergencies would not be restricted to the confines of the 
individual states.21 In this way the states were to be protected
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from abuse of the militia, while the national government would 
not be caught short by a dearth of well-trained soldiers.
Knox's 1786 plan, if enacted, would have bypassed the need 
for the standing army that terrified anti-federalist thinkers of 
the period. The plan had appeal to republican thinkers, with its 
emphasis on inculcating the youth with wholesome virtues such as 
physical fitness and clean living. The expense and time required 
by the plan, however, would have doomed it had the Confederation 
existed long enough to consider it seriously. Also, the idea of 
a nationally controlled militia was contrary to what some 
republican thinkers felt was safe.22 With the advent of the 
Constitutional Convention, Knox's plan submerged temporarily in 
the consciousness of national lawmakers, to resurface in the 
First Congress.
After the ratification of the Constitution, President 
Washington again asked Knox to present a plan for a national 
militia. In January, 1790, Secretary of War Knox presented the 
1786 plan, slightly modified, to Congress for consideration. Not 
helping the cause of a national militia was Knox's‘prefacing 
letter, which mentioned the need of the country for "a national 
system of defense adequate to the probable exigencies of the 
United States, whether arising from internal or external 
causes."23 While extolling the virtues of trained citizens in 
arms, Knox rather gracelessly mentioned that "The convulsive 
events, generated by the inordinate pursuit of riches or 
ambition, require that the Government should possess a strong
corrective 66 arm. "24
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The suggestion, probably unintentional, that a national 
militia could be useful in suppressing an unruly populace struck 
the wrong tone with congressmen concerned with preserving 
liberties so recently hard-won. The plan's federal supervision 
would also require a natural diminishing of the individual state 
militia's military independence. Noting these factors, General 
Benjamin Lincoln confided to Knox that though the bill "would 
make ours the strongest militia in the world, the people will not 
adopt it here if I know Massachusetts."25
General Lincoln's prediction proved correct, largely 
because, with all philosophic considerations aside, Knox's plan 
to "perpetuate and secure the invaluable principles of liberty" 
would cost an estimated $384,440 for one year's operation of the 
advanced corps.26 In addition to the financial objections lay 
concerns that the "virtuous conduct of youth" referred to in 
Knox's outline might not be best continued in a military camp.27
With Hamilton's financial program the most urgent and 
time-consuming matter facing the First Congress, Knox's 1790 plan 
for a federally supervised militia disappeared onto the 
legislative back burner until it reappeared in July 1790, greatly 
altered by a congressional committee. This bill, introduced by 
Elias Boudinot, still retained the concept of using the youngest 
men, in this bill those aged eighteen to twenty-five, as an elite 
light infantry force in the militia battalion or regiment.28 
After emerging in this configuration, the militia bill went back 
into committee seclusion for another five months, until it was 
debated in December 1790.29
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During the debates of December 1790, Congress argued over 
the issues of the ages involved in the proposed militia plan, the 
ever-present issue of state versus federal power, and the 
ultimately destructive issue of exemptions from militia service. 
Quakers especially objected to military service on grounds of 
conscience. James Jackson of Georgia, who was later to lose his 
seat to Anthony Wayne in one of the most fraudulent elections in 
Georgia history, vehemently attacked the granting of religious 
exemptions, noting that the ultimate consequence of granting 
exemptions was a standing army.30 Aedanus Burke, himself a 
militia member, argued that widespread exemptions would lead to a 
situation where society would split into two classes of people: 
the rich and the working class. He felt that "all should equally 
be made to turn out in the ranks, high and low, rich and poor, 
old and young, and thus make the militia honorable."31
However, Burke, and James Madison saw no problem with 
granting exemption from militia duty for those truly religiously 
scrupulous of bearing arms. Madison did not believe that “the 
citizens of the United States would hypocritically renounce their 
principles, their conscience, and their God, for the sake of 
enjoying the exemption."32 Another exemption surfaced in this 
debate that was perhaps not as high-minded as that of the 
Quakers: that of congressional exemption from militia duty. 
Boudinot himself defended congressional exemption by saying:
"The business of legislation is more arduous and momentous than 
any other; and ought not to be impeded, or rendered liable to be 
frustrated by any other."33
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After the debates of December, 1790, the militia bill again 
languished in committee for many months, not reappearing until 
just three days before St. Clair's defeat in November, 1791. 
According to one of the leading historians of the Federalist Era, 
Richard H. Kohn, "agreement was impossible on any provision which 
increased the burden on individual citizens or provided for a 
national standard."34 The bill became a classic case of what 
occurs when something attempts to be all things to all people.
By the time the bill finally came to a vote in March, 1792,
Knox's original plan had been stripped of classing, federal 
inspection of state militia, and fines for non-compliance with 
militia rules. In its tremendously altered form, the law of 1792 
did not much resemble its original version of 1790.
While the tortured efforts of the Second Congress to produce 
a workable plan for a national militia bogged down in a slough of 
compromises, the debates on the militia issue did serve to point 
up the differences of opinion prevalent in the House. The 
variety of objections to the original act emphasized the 
uselessness of trying to generate a system of truly universal 
military service in a large republic. The abundance of 
self-interested parties seeking exemptions from militia duty is 
proof that Knox's original 1790 could never survive intact in its 
course toward passage as the Uniform Militia Act. However, the 
often passionate debates over the Uniform Militia Act and the 
Frontier Bill do serve as additional evidence of the deepening 
political rift in the Second Congress.
67
NOTES
1Geoffrey Perret, A Country Made By War: From the 
Revolution to Vietnam--the Story of America's Rise to Power (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1989), 85.
2Lawrence Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and the 
Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 78-84.
3Cress, 80.
4Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the 
Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (new 
York: The Free Press, 1975), 46. See also John C. Fitzpatrick,
ed., The Writings of George Washington, vol. 26 (Washington, D. 
C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1933), 375-394.
5Don Higginbotham, George Washington and the American 
Military Tradition (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia 
Press, 1985), 124-126.
6Cress, 86.
7Kohn, 47.
8Cress, 87.
9Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military 
Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1962), 15.
10John K. Mahon, The American Militia: Decade of Decision. 
1789-1800 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), 12.
nKenneth R. Bowling, "'A Place to Which Tribute Is 
Brought': The Contest for the Federal Capital in 1783,"
Prologue: A Journal of the National Archives 8 (Fall 1976): 
129-130. Bowling notes that the actions of the mutinous regular 
soldiers led to a resolution by Congress to move temporarily to 
New Jersey unless Pennsylvania took measures against these 
troops.
12Kohn, 50-53.
13George Athan Billias, Elbridge Gerry: Founding Father and 
Republican Statesman (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976), 
108-113.
14Cress, 90-91.
68
15Knox's reply to President Washington's request for a 
militia plan, Annals of the Congress of the United States, ed. 
Joseph Gales, Sr. (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834), 
Appendix, 2:2095.
16Annals of Congress. 2:2095, 2097; Cress, 91.
17Annals of Congress. 2:2099.
18Ibid. , 2:2099, 2101.
19Ibid. , 2:2100.
20Ibid.
21Cress, 20.
22Ibid. , 90-91; Mahon, 7.
23Annals of Congress. 2:2087; Mahon, 14.
24Annals of Congress. 2:2088.
25Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial 
Spirit in America. 1775-1865 (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company,
1968), 183.
26Annals of Congress, 2:2103.
27Kohn, 131.
28Cunlif fe, 184.
29Annals of Congress. 2:1804-27.
30Ibid. , 2:1822-23.
31Ibid., 2:1822,24. See also Richard Wilson Renner, 
"Conscientious Objection and the Federal Government, 1781-1792," 
Military Affairs 37 (December 1974): 142-44.
32Speech of James Madison on the Uniform Militia Act, Annals 
of Congress, 2:1811.
33Ibid.
34Kohn, 134-35.
CHAPTER FIVE: POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Before analyzing the voting patterns of the Second 
Congress, we must examine the political circumstances facing 
those legislators. Voting on such issues as the Uniform Militia 
Act and the Five Regiment Bill, the congressmen were acting in an 
era of much more loosely categorized political allegiances than 
those same congressmen even a session later. Polarization of 
political philosophies and attitudes into two vigorous, opposing 
parties in the House and Senate that had begun with objections to 
Hamilton's financial programs was soon to accelerate as a result 
of the uproar over the conduct of foreign affairs.1
With the political bifurcation that issued from these and 
other events, divisions between Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
(later Democratic-Republicans or simply Republicans) became more 
identifiable in the Third and subsequent Congresses than in the 
Second. One of the leading historians of this period, John C. 
Miller, says that "especially in the House of Representatives, 
many members refused to wear the livery of either party; instead, 
they made a point of voting as the interests of their state and 
section, rather than the party leaders, dictated. Even as late 
as the Third Congress (1795-96) almost half the members of the 
House prided themselves upon being free of party ties and 
obligations."2 Although many legislators sought to distance 
themselves from party labels, use of cluster-bloc analysis does
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show that a large number of members in the Second Congress 
regularly voted for one of the two major factions.
Although Alexander Hamilton and James Madison became leaders 
of opposing political groups, both had warned against the dangers 
of faction or party before the Constitution was ratified.
Madison offered the view in The Federalist Papers that a faction 
was "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or 
minority of the whole, who are united or actuated by some common 
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of 
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of 
the community."3 In Madison's opinion, although faction was a 
regrettable element in the polity of the nation, it was an 
unavoidable by-product of a free society. As he said: "Liberty 
is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it 
instantly expires."4 Madison continued on the subject of 
political faction by noting that, since the causes of faction 
could not be removed, "relief is to be sought in the means of 
controlling its effects."5
Arguing at the time for a stronger union, Madison felt that 
the best restraint upon the effects of faction was a healthy 
republican form of government. For safety's sake, a large 
republic was preferable to a small one. With a large society, 
the influence of a particular sect would be diluted, while in a 
tiny society the danger of "factious combinations" would be 
enlarged. Acknowledging that parties (a designation that Madison 
used interchangeably with faction) would exist in a free society, 
Madison opted for the idea of safety in numbers.6 This idea, 
with its parallels in the field of religious liberty, notes
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Richard Hofstadter, apparently originated from Madison's 
philosophical attraction to the ideas of Voltaire, who had once 
noted that "in England one sect would have produced slavery and 
two a civil war, but that a multitude of sects caused the people 
to live in peace."7
In a letter to the National Gazette in January 1792, Madison 
reaffirmed his opinion that parties were unavoidable, but evil.
"A difference of interests, real or supposed, is the most natural 
and fruitful source of them," wrote Madison on the origins of 
political parties.8 Besides "withholding unnecessary 
opportunities from a few, to increase the inequality of property, 
by an immoderate, and especially an unmerited, accumulation of 
riches," Madison said one way to "combat the evil" of party was 
to make "one party a check on the other, so far as the existence 
of parties cannot be prevented, nor their views accommodated. If 
this is not the voice of reason, it is that of republicanism."9
The party that Madison and republicanism were determined to 
check during the 1790's was headed by a man Forrest McDonald 
called the "most brilliant bastard in American history."10 By 
1792 opposition to Hamilton's programs of funding the public debt 
and establishment of a national bank, and his general 
interference in the affairs of other departments of the 
government, had resulted in a potent political alliance between 
Madison and Jefferson. In a curious turnabout from his earlier 
stance against party and faction, Hamilton was now engaged in a 
bitter struggle for political control of the country.11 Defense 
policy was just one of many issues outside the bounds of the 
Treasury Department in which Hamilton felt compelled to meddle.
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In fact, according to John C. Miller, "so completely did he 
dominate Henry Knox, the Secretary of War, that he [Knox] became 
hardly more than a minion of the Treasury."12
Writing in Federalist 21. in December, 1787, Hamilton had 
warned that "A successful faction may erect a tyranny on the 
ruins of order and law, while no succour could constitutionally 
be afforded by the Union to the friends and supporters of the 
government."13 Referring in this case to Shay's Rebellion, 
Hamilton also condemned the danger of "inordinate pride of State 
importance" in the Confederation system.14 In a later issue of 
The Federalist. Hamilton referred to the necessity of "the terror 
of an example" when dealing with domestic rebellion or seditious 
behavior, an ominous foreshadowing of the eagerness with which he 
forced the issue of the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794.15 On the 
whole, Hamilton's writings suggest a greater willingness to use 
force against those opposing the government than do the writings 
of Madison.16
Statements by Hamilton against the wickedness of faction may 
seem strange in retrospect, considering Hamilton's aggressiveness 
in implementing his financial and other policies. Richard 
Hofstadter offers the suggestion that "the whole tradition of 
anti-party writing is full of the works of men who were strong 
partisans; this tradition is, in very large part, the work of 
partisan writers and political leaders who are actually appealing 
to a general distrust of the idea of a party or to advance the 
interest of another party whose greatest claim to glory is that 
it will surmount and eliminate the party battle itself.”17 Such 
behavior, which would have been hypocrisy had it been conscious,
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was unbecoming to the character of an eighteenth-century 
gentleman. But this was soon to be small potatoes compared to 
the bitter partisan rivalry that would erupt as relations with 
France and England worsened.
Writing in 1779 to Thomas McKean, John Adams spoke of the
merits of an opposition in Congress or a council "to balance
individuals, and bodies, and interests one against another, and
bring the truth to light and justice to prevail.”18 However,
Adams apparently saw a difference between a "loyal"
issue-oriented opposition and narrow patron-client partisanship,
since in a letter a year later to Jonathan Jackson he said:
There is nothing I dread so much as a division of the 
republic into two great parties, each arranged under its 
leader, and concerting measures in opposition to each 
other. This, in my humble apprehension, is to be dreaded 
as the greatest political evil under our Constitution.19
Adams could not have been pleased with the political
situation as it stood in the early 1790's, as both Hamilton and
Jefferson had discovered not only a mutual political antagonism,
but the handiness of the press for party purposes. To counter
Hamilton's Gazette of the United States, edited by John Fenno,
Jefferson enticed the thoroughly republican Philip Freneau to
work in Philadelphia as editor of the National Gazette.
Jefferson even used political patronage as an incentive for
Freneau to journey to the capital in 1791 and goad the
Federalists in his paper.20 Jefferson, through Freneau, took
every opportunity to attack Hamilton's financial programs, which
ran directly contrary to Jefferson's conception of an agrarian
society, a society where farmers, rather than merchants and
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speculators, would represent the true nature of American 
society.21
Although both Jefferson and Madison were active in arranging 
Freneau's newspaper career, Noble Cunningham claims that "there 
is no basis for assuming that Jefferson and Madison set out to 
organize a political party with a blueprint in hand and that the 
establishment of a party newspaper was the first step."22 Rather, 
the Freneau venture was a result of Jefferson and Madison's 
frustration in informing the public of the inequities of 
Hamilton's financial programs. Cunningham notes that the end 
result of Freneau's paper was to speed the formation of national 
political parties by "bringing the conflict between Jefferson and 
Hamilton before the public view. ”23
By May 1792, Hamilton had been prodded enough to confide his 
feelings on the political situation in a rather petulant letter 
to Edward Carrington. Hamilton noted that Madison's "insidious 
insinuations" (Hamilton's emphasis) suggesting that Hamilton was 
involved in speculation were "actuated by personal and political 
animosity."24 Hamilton went on to accuse Madison of subverting 
the administration's measures and attempting to diminish the role 
of the Secretary of the Treasury in the government.25
Interestingly, in the long and angry letter to Carrington, 
Hamilton mentioned that "Mr. Madison nevertheless opposed 
directly a reference to me to report wavs & means for the Western 
expedition, & combatted on principle the propriety of such 
measures."26 What Hamilton was referring to here was the Five 
Regiment Bill, or Frontier Bill, to raise an additional three 
regiments to the regular army's existing two. The resolution
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that provoked Hamilton was that of 7 March 1792 resolving "That 
the Secretary of the Treasury be directed to report to this House 
his opinion of the best mode for raising the additional supplies 
requisite for the ensuing year."27 Hamilton viewed this as an 
infringement on his power, and Theodore Sedgwick, as ardent a 
Federalist as ever there was, rushed to head off this challenge 
by Madison.
Sedgwick condensed Madison's arguments in order to rebut
them:
This gentleman [Madison] had given in detail the several 
proceedings which ought to take place to obtain on hand the 
benefit of knowledge of the Secretary, and to maintain on 
the other the independency of the House. Thus, according 
to his plan, was the business to be pursued. The House 
was, in the first place, to call on the Secretary for a 
state of facts; it was then to resolve itself into a 
Committee of the Whole, to form opinions; these opinions 
were then to be referred to the Secretary, for him to 
report respecting them a systematic arrangement.28
Hamilton was enraged at this ploy by Madison, and vowed that
"if he had prevailed, a certain consequence was, my
resignation--that I would not be fool enough to make pecuniary
sacrifices and endure a life of extreme drudgery without
opportunity either to do material good or to acquire reputation;
and frequently with responsibility in reputation for measures in
which I had no hand, and in respect to which, the part I had
acted, if any, could not be known."29
Hamilton then mentioned, in a manner indicating the cynical
Federalist philosophy of human nature mentioned by John C.
Miller, that "several, who had generally acted with me from
various motives, vanity, self importance, &c. &c. were enlisted"
against Madison's efforts.30 Despite Hamilton's boast that he had
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confounded Madison by his counteroffensive in the House, the 
resolution passed by a vote of thirty-one to twenty-seven.31
Later in his same letter to Carrington, Hamilton bitterly 
resented the efforts of Jefferson and Madison "to narrow the 
Federal authority," not only on the issue of a national bank, but 
also in the field of military affairs. Singling out Madison in 
particular, Hamilton growled that "in the Militia bill & in a 
variety of minor cases he has leaned to abridging the exercise of 
federal [.sic] authority, & leaving as much as possible to the 
States & he has lost no opportunity of sounding the alarm with 
great affected solemnity at encroachments meditated on the rights 
of the States, & of holding up the bugbear of a faction in the 
Government having designs unfriendly to Liberty."32
What Hamilton referred to was Madison's attempt to modify 
"An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the 
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions." 
Madison had acted to restrict the exercise of the President's 
power "to the recess of Congress and till an unspecified number 
of days after the next session shall commence."33 As the act 
finally passed Congress on May 2, 1792, the President could call 
forth the militia to suppress insurrections "until the expiration 
of thirty days after the commencement of the ensuing session."34 
This time limit would supposedly prevent the accrual of total 
control of power over the militia by the President. At the same 
time it seems to have infuriated Alexander Hamilton.
So virulent became the conflict between Hamilton and 
Jefferson that President Washington tried to mediate the dispute. 
Fearful of losing either of his most gifted secretaries,
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Washington appealed to both men. Writing to Hamilton in August, 
1792, Washington said: "Differences in political opinions are as 
unavoidable as, to a certain point, they may perhaps be 
necessary; but it is to be regretted, exceedingly, that subjects 
cannot be discussed with temper on one hand, or decisions 
submitted to without having the motives which led to them, 
improperly implicated on the other: and this regret borders on 
chagrin when we find that Men of abilities--zealous 
patriots--having the same general objects in view, and the same 
upright intentions to prosecute them, will not exercise more 
charity in deciding on the opinions, and actions of one 
another. ”35
Washington went on to tell Hamilton that mutual forbearances 
should be exercised by all parties in the dispute, or else "I do 
not see how the Reins of Government are to be managed, or how the 
Union of the States can be much longer preserved." The President 
noted that the political conflict between the two faction leaders 
showed "the consequences of diversified opinions, when pushed 
with too much tenacity."36
In a similar message to Jefferson describing the 
difficulties facing the nation on the western frontiers, 
Washington repeated the themes of harmony and reconciliation he 
expressed to Hamilton, and added how unfortunate it was "that 
while we are encompassed on all sides with avowed enemies and 
insidious friends, that internal dissensions should be harrowing 
and tearing our vitals." Appealing for charity to prevail among 
his subordinates, Washington called for an end to "wounding 
suspicions and irritable charges" or else the "wheels of
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Government will clog." Washington noted that the infighting that 
had occurred among his cabinet members had embarrassed the nation 
and given him personal pain. ”37
Despite his appeals for peace within his cabinet, Washington 
was to be disappointed, since the philosophies and personalities 
of Hamilton and Jefferson were too contradictory to allow an easy 
settlement of differences. Hamilton would never imbibe 
Jefferson's or Madison's ideas of republicanism, since he would 
never overcome his doubts about the stability of republican 
government. Also, by 1792, the personal animosity between the 
two men had reached the point of no return.38 The rift eventually 
culminated in a power struggle that only ended with the removal 
from the political scene of one of these men.39
One of the more prominent Federalist congressmen in the 
Second House who was alert to the rising sectionalism in 
legislative matters was Fisher Ames of Massachusetts. Writing to 
a friend in January 1792, Ames observed that the Federalists were 
in power now but that "an immense mass of sour matter is 
fermenting at the southward."40 After making this uncomplimentary 
comment on his colleagues from the South, Ames noted later that 
month the emergence of a southern voting coalition in the Second 
House: "Virginia moves in a solid column, and the discipline of
the party is as severe as the Prussians. Deserters are not 
spared."41 While Ames' comments were colored by partisan 
rhetoric, he correctly identified Madison as the man in charge in 
the opposition bloc of the House. Ames noted that "Madison is 
become a desperate party leader, and I am not sure of his 
stopping at any ordinary point of extremity."42 As cluster bloc
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analysis shows, Ames was correct in his assessment of the 
regional nature of the opposing voting bloc, at least on the 
overall business of the Second Congress.
The development of political parties, which accelerated 
during the second administration of George Washington, was, 
according to Joseph Charles, foreshadowed by the sectional 
division resulting from the vote on Hamilton's financial 
program.43 Charles, like Cunningham, McDonald, and most modern 
historians, refuted Charles Beard's thesis that the origin of the 
Republican Party can be found in the remnants of the old 
Antifederalists.44 Referring to the idea of a political party 
connection between the Constitutional Convention and the federal 
Congress, Cunningham remarked that "the fact that twelve 
Federalists of 1787 became Republicans and six could not be 
classified seems of equal significance with the fact that 
twenty-five became Federalists and suggests the impossibility of 
showing any substantial relationship."45
Charles thought that Hamilton's financial proposals in the 
First Congress were "the first milestones in the growth of 
parties," but he conceded that it is difficult to pin down an 
exact date when parties came into existence with definitive 
characteristics.46 Cunningham, on the other hand, points out that 
the elections of 1792 serve as evidence that Republicans were 
organizing as a party, although "it was clear that parties did 
not reach very deeply into the political life of the country."47 
McDonald seems to agree with Cunningham, for he argues that 
political activity in the country prior to 1793 was still 
primarily a local or regional concern for those involved in it,
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although awareness of national affairs was beginning to emerge in 
the electorate.48
Cunningham documented the voting record of the first session 
of the Second Congress (October 1791 to May 1792) and found that 
Madison had developed a following of sorts. Using a rather 
unsophisticated method of analysis, in which Madison's voting 
behavior was assumed to be a perfect archetype of 
Anti-Federalism, Cunningham selected thirty-five roll calls 
during that session. He found that seventeen men agreed with 
Madison at least two-thirds of the time. Another group of 
thirteen to fifteen members opposed the Madison group, leaving 
about half of the House apparently neutral or pro-Federalist in 
this coalescing political situation. Cunningham is quick to note 
that there was not yet a rigid two-party organization in 
Congress, although the alliances forming in this session did not 
appear to have been extant in the previous one.49
One event in particular that emphasizes the growing partisan 
outlook in the Second Congress is the disputed election of 
Anthony Wayne. During the 1791 campaign for a House of 
Representatives seat from coastal Georgia, Anthony Wayne (of 
Revolutionary War fame) and James Jackson, the incumbent, 
conducted what seemed to be an uneventful campaign for the 
position. After Wayne's apparent victory, however, Jackson came 
forward with evidence of election rigging by Wayne's campaign 
manager. During the process of trying to regain his seat in the 
House, Jackson encountered on a national scale the sort of 
partisanship that characterized his home district, where he 
represented an avid Anti-Federal point of view. Wayne, on the
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other hand, stood squarely for the policies of the Federalist 
administration, particularly as a member of the locally unpopular 
"Yazoo" faction.50
The contrast between Jackson, an ardent supporter of 
Madison, and Wayne, a loyal follower of the Federalist line, was 
not lost on the members of Congress as they deliberated the 
issue. Right from the start, Wayne's case for retaining the seat 
was so weak that the issue was not whether to retain Wayne in the 
House, but whether the Federalists in the body would give the 
seat back to Jackson, a disciple of Madison.51 After an aborted 
Federalist motion to declare simply that Wayne "was not duly 
elected a member of this House," Republican Representative 
William Giles of Virginia made a motion that spelled out 
Jackson's right to Wayne's seat. The vote was tied, 29 yeas to 
29 nays. When the Speaker, Representative Jonathan Trumbull of 
Connecticut, voted with the nays, Wayne's seat was declared 
vacant.52
Lisle Rose notes that of the twenty-nine voting in favor 
of the Giles (and Jackson) motion, a mere three were identified 
by Clerk of the House John Beckley as Federalist-oriented. On 
the other hand, Beckley identified twelve of these twenty-nine 
negative voters as having Federalist leanings. As Rose says: 
"Prior to Jay's Treaty the Wayne-Jackson election was the most 
important popular test in the South of emerging partisan strength 
on both sides. The administration hosts had not merely been 
defeated; they had been disgraced. 1,53
The Second Congress, then, had come to display partisan 
aspects in its voting behavior, albeit mostly regional in nature,
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and this despite the original protestations of the most 
influential politicians of the era, such as Madison and Hamilton, 
who despite their declamations against the dangers of factions, 
became leaders of opposing political parties. The clash of 
philosophies that had been delineated by Hamilton's financial 
activities had been accelerated by current events in France, and 
each controversial bill that came to a vote in the House became 
an opportunity to exhibit yet more partisan voting behavior.
One would expect the incipient partisanship that had begun 
to emerge in the Second House to extend to all issues that 
appeared before the House. As cluster bloc analysis will show in 
the next chapter, this in general holds true, but only when 
examining the business of the entire House. As we will see, 
there were still issues, such as the military future of the 
nation, that did not produce particular factional unanimity when
votes were cast.
83
NOTES
:Forrest McDonald, The Presidency of George Washington 
(Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1974), 89-90.
2John C. Miller, The Federalist Era: 1789-1801 (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1960), 124.
3Max Beloff, ed., The Federalist Or, the New Constitution, 
Federalist 10, by James Madison (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948), 
42.
4Ibid.
5Ibid., 44.
6Ibid., 46-47.
7Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System: The Rise 
of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 61.
8The Papers of James Madison, ed. Robert A. Rutland, et al., 
vol. 14 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1983), 
197.
9Ibid.
10Mcdonald, 62.
“Ibid., 89-111.
“Miller, 84.
13The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syrett, et 
al., 27 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966-1987), 
4:397.
“Ibid.
15Ibid. , 627.
“Hofstadter, 17.
“ibid., 17-18.
“The Works of John Adams, ed. Charles Francis Adams, vol. 9 
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1850-56), 485.
19John Adams to Jonathan Jackson, October 2, 1780, ibid.,
511.
20Frank Luther Mott, American Journalism, A History: 
1690-1960, 3d ed. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1971),
84
124-25.
21Miller, 92-97.
22Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., The Jeffersonian Republicans:
The Formation of Party Organization, 1789-1801 (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1957), 19.
23Ibid.
24Alexander Hamilton to Edward Carrington, May 26, 1792, 
Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 11:435.
25Ibid. , 435-41.
26Ibid. , 432-33.
27Annals of Congress, 3:437.
28Ibid. , 439-40.
29Alexander Hamilton to Edward Carrington, May 26, 1792, 
Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 11:433.
30Ibid. ; Miller, 110.
31Annals of Congress, 3:452.
32Hamilton to Carrington, May 26, 1792, Papers of Alexander 
Hamilton. 11:438.
33Ibid. For the complete text of the law, see An Act to 
Provide for Calling Forth the Militia to Execute the Laws of the 
Union. Suppress Insurrections and Repel Invasions. Statutes at 
Large. 1, 264 (1792).
34Annals of Congress. 3:1370-72.
35George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, August 26, 1792, 
Papers of Alexander Hamilton. 12:276.
35Ibid. , 276-77.
37George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, August 23, 1792, The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. John Catanzariti, et al., vol. 24 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 317.
38Miller, 95-97.
39McDonald, 95.
40Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight, January 13, 1792, in Seth 
Ames, ed., Works of Fisher Ames, with a Selection from his 
Speeches and Correspondence (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 
1854), 110.
85
41Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight, January 26, 1792, in Works of 
Fisher Ames. 126.
42Ibid.
43Joseph Charles, The Origins of the American Party System: 
Three Essays (Williamsburg, Virginia: The Institute of Early 
American Culture, 1956), 21.
44Charles, 21; Cunningham, 23; McDonald, 296.
45Cunningham, 23n71.
46Charles, 26, 93-95.
47Cunningham, 49.
48McDonald, 89-111.
49Cunningham, 22.
50Lisle A. Rose, Prologue to Democracy: The Federalists in 
the South. 1789-1800 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 
1968), 63-66.
51Ibid. , 67.
52Annals of Congress, 3: 472, 479.
53Rose, 67-68.
CHAPTER SIX: CLUSTER BLOC ANALYSIS
The members of the Second Congress were operating in a 
period of looser party development than their colleagues in the 
subsequent congresses of the Federalist Era. The crises of 
political conscience that came about as a result of the French 
Revolution and produced two sharply delineated political entities 
had not yet reached critical importance by 1791, when the 
majority of the members of the Second Congress took their seats. 
Even though the labels Republican and Federalist had not reached 
common usage when referring to congressmen, some division on 
issues had occurred, whether by local self-interest or in 
opposition to Hamilton's financial programs.
While the issue of national defense in the Second Congress 
does not receive the attention by historians that the 
establishment of the Hamiltonian financial system or the crises 
looming from across the sea do, nevertheless military concerns 
are important in the period. The struggle to establish a 
national system for the militia, the effort to create a more 
efficient regular army, and the resulting disagreements among 
congressmen are matters that should take their place in the study 
of the period with more widely recognized issues. Despite the 
somewhat nebulous political atmosphere of the Second Congress, 
some grouping of congressmen can be found by using Rice-Beyle 
cluster-bloc analysis. By use of this process, some voting
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patterns can be identified among congressmen, although the system 
of party identification had not yet evolved into its later form.1 
As an example of how scattered the voting could be at this period 
in congressional development, a look at the Uniform Militia Act 
of 1792 is useful. It was passed without the crystal-clear party 
definition of later congresses, but nevertheless was the most 
significant legislation affecting militia for a century. John 
Mahon notes the lack of a clear voting pattern on the issue, but 
there is an interesting connection between the roll call on final 
passage of the bill and the personal experiences of the 
individual members.2
Of the fifty-eight members of the House who voted on the 
Uniform Militia Act in its final form, only nine of the 
thirty-one yea voters (29 percent) had military experience of any 
sort. On the nay side, however, of the twenty-seven who voted 
against the measure a significant nineteen (70 percent) had 
served in some military capacity, either in the Revolution or the 
French and Indian War. Possibly some of the opposition to the 
bill came from those veterans disgusted with the bill's obvious 
weaknesses and lax standards of enforcement. Certainly Jeremiah 
Wadsworth, who had sponsored the bill until it was further 
emasculated just before passage, did not care for it in its 
eventual weakened form. Indeed, as mentioned before, Wadsworth 
himself voted against it when the time came for the roll call.
Anti-administration men such as Josiah Parker of Virginia, 
who had fought in such fierce battles as Trenton and Brandywine 
during the Revolution, may have decided that they could not 
support in good conscience an act that would lead to military
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weakness, despite the rhetoric surrounding the theory of a 
stalwart militia. Other usual allies of Madison parted company 
with him on this vote, including John Page and Samuel Griffin, 
fellow Virginians, but unlike Madison, veterans of extended 
campaigning during the Revolution. As Table 1 indicates, there 
was a wide voting disparity between legislators who had perhaps 
had the chance to see actual fighting and those who had not.
VETERANS/NON-VETERANS
VETERANS
YEA 9 (32%)
NAY 19 (68%)
28 (100%)
TABLE 1
FINAL PASSAGE OF THE
NON-VETERANS
22 (73%)
8 (27%)
30 (100%)
UNIFORM MILITIA ACT
TOTAL
31 (53%) 
27 (47%)
58 (100%)
Among the supporters of the Uniform Militia Act as it 
finally passed the House was North Carolina's John Steele, a 
representative from a district which had had its share of Indian 
troubles.3 Despite the somewhat sketchy performance of the 
militia on the frontier, Steele was a firm believer in the 
superiority of militia over regular armies in the western portion 
of the country. Also in the yea group on this bill was the old 
Anti-Federalist Elbridge Gerry, who did not agree in any 
appreciable way with other voting blocs in this Congress. He 
was, however, a committed opponent of the classic standing army 
and a devoted adherent to the notion of a virtuous republican 
militia.4 How many others thought like Gerry on this issue is 
difficult to say, since not all in this Congress were as 
vociferous as Gerry in expressing their opinions, but the fear of
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a liberty-threatening standing army was certainly not confined to 
Gerry alone, and this attitude must have been a factor in the 
decision by some of his colleagues to vote yea on the issue.
Another supporter of the Uniform Militia Act was the devout 
Federalist Fisher Ames of Massachusetts. Although Ames supported 
the Frontier Bill, with its emphasis on a larger, more effective 
regular army, as the way to conclude the Indian campaign, he 
supported the Militia Act as a means of extending federal control 
over the states. In the words of his biographer, Winfred 
Bernhard, Ames "was dubious about the effectiveness of the bill 
as it stood, but voted with the majority in favor of it as he 
felt the need to make a beginning even if the legislation turned 
out to be feeble and poor."5 Another important congressional 
leader who voted for the much-altered Militia Bill was the 
redoubtable James Madison of Virginia, who, after having 
supported the militia concept vociferously time and again, was 
placed in the position of having to support the bill from the 
necessities of his republican philosophy rather than from any 
love of the bill's provisions.
Among the congressmen opposing passage of the Militia Act, 
only the delegates from Georgia, all of whom were veterans of the 
Revolution, voted solidly against it. The headstrong Anthony 
Wayne, of Stony Point fame, could have influenced the rest of his 
state's delegation against the measure. Wayne had been one of 
the militia's most steadfast detractors in the debates prior to 
passage of this and the Frontier Bill, and it is also likely that 
his extensive military experience during the Revolution had led 
him to a distaste for all things militia.6 Wayne may also have
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known of his candidacy for leadership of the remodeled U. S. Army 
at this time, and may have sought to diminish the role of the 
militia to enhance the importance of regular forces. At any 
rate, this was to be one of his last votes due to his impending 
removal from the House for election improprieties.
For whatever reasons congressmen of the Second House had for 
voting against the Militia Bill, the nays were split between 
those whom Stanley Parsons has labeled pro-administration and 
those he labels anti-administration (the terms Federalist and 
Republican being not yet appropriate).7 The nays included 
fifteen of the thirty-six pro-administration congressmen (42 
percent) and eleven of the twenty-one anti-administration men. 
Shearjashub Bourne of Massachusetts was an independent who was 
the twelfth nay on this measure. Of those representatives who 
voted in favor of the bill as it was sent to the Senate, 
twenty-one (58 percent) were what Parsons calls 
pro-administration in their voting sentiments, and ten (45 
percent) were what he calls anti-administration in policy.
However, the single vote on final passage provides only weak 
basis for any definitive conclusions. Table 2 illustrates the 
final vote on the Uniform Militia Act.
TABLE 2
UNIFORM MILITIA ACT 
HOUSE VOTE, FINAL PASSAGE
PRO-ADMINISTRATION ANTI-ADMINISTRATION TOTAL
Yea
Nay
21 (58%) 
15 (42%)
10 (45%) 
12 (55%)
31 (53%) 
27 (47%)
36 (100%) 22 (100%) 58 (100%)
Includes one Independent, Bourne, Mass.
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When all eleven defense-related roll calls of the Second 
Congress under consideration are analyzed together using 
Rice-Beyle cluster bloc analysis at a minimum index of agreement 
of seventy per cent, two blocs emerge. However, analysis of 
these blocs indicated that this was the wrong approach. Lumping 
together all eleven votes obscured more than it revealed, and 
indicated primarily that most representatives did not see the 
militia issue and the frontier regiments issue as closely 
connected problems. Rather, roll-call voting behavior indicates 
that congressmen saw two issues where the modern researcher, 
having full benefit of hindsight, thought perhaps there was 
really only one issue--military defense. Whereas two small blocs 
emerged from analysis of all eleven defense related votes, a more 
distinct pattern emerged when the defense votes were divided into 
two groups for analysis: frontier votes and militia votes. By 
organizing the votes into these two subject areas, a small, but 
interesting, pattern of voting appeared. Since seven members of 
the House were either not present or not voting except during a 
couple of the roll calls under consideration, these men were 
eliminated from the analysis. Also, the fringe members that 
appeared when the votes were split into two subject areas are not 
included in the tabulations. (Due to the small number of votes 
examined, the number of fringe members was too small to be of 
consequence. The fringe members for the total business of the 
Second Congress, however, are included in Appendix F to give a 
general feeling of where their voting sympathies lay.)8
Table 3 examines the voting alliances found when considering 
the six militia related votes. The militia was a form of
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national defense which many saw as both the preservation of the 
republican way of life and as a means of countering potential 
Federalist encroachment on state and private liberties. What is 
most interesting is the way the "Regular Bloc" (Bloc One, 
generally favoring regular forces as the means of the nation's 
defense) is composed almost totally of pro-administration 
congressmen (84 percent), with only one administration opponent, 
and a second labeled an independent by Parsons. While several of 
the members of this bloc were warm theoretical supporters of a 
well-trained militia, this group in general followed the 
Federalist line in seeking a more effective response to the 
nation's military problems. The Militia Bloc, Bloc 2, includes 
such pro-militia stalwarts as James Madison and John Steele, and 
is markedly anti-administration in makeup (75 percent).
TABLE 3
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY FACTION 
MILITIA ISSUE, SIX RELATED VOTES 
(#4,5,6,8,10,11)
BLOCK 1:
PRO-REGULAR
BLOCK 2: 
PRO-MILITIA TOTAL
PRO-ADMIN 10 (83%) 2 (25%) 12 (60%)
ANTI-ADMIN 2 (17%) 6 (75%) 8 (40%)
12 (100%) 8 (100%) 20 (100%)
* Includes one Independent, Bourne, Massachusetts, so labeled by 
Parsons, et al. The Biographical Directory of American Congress 
does not identify him as belonging to any party. In this, as in 
all tables, percentages may not equal 100 due to the effects of 
rounding. See Appendix A for a listing of the roll calls, and 
Appendix D for a list of bloc members.
Table 4 indicates the divisions that appear when the 
question of a stronger regular military force on the nation's
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frontier came to a vote in the Second Congress. The members of 
the "pro-Frontier" bloc do not seem to be as dogmatic in their 
voting patterns, due to the nature of the country's problems on 
the frontier. Pro-administration members are the majority in 
both blocs on the frontier issue, underscoring the point that the 
legislators were not bound to a political consistency on this 
matter. Although militia had come to grief on the frontier 
during the St. Clair and Harmar campaigns, the seeming necessity 
of defending states with exposed frontiers with regular troops 
did not seem to override most of the anti-administration 
representatives' fears of an overbearing standing army. 
Congressmen Steele and Ashe of North Carolina, men from a state 
with a very real possibility of Indian attack, joined the other 
congressmen in the Frontier roll call bloc which opposed an
TABLE 4
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY FACTION 
FRONTIER ISSUE, FIVE RELATED VOTES 
(#1,2,3,7,9)
BLOCK 1: 
PRO-FRONTIER
BLOCK 2:
ANTI-FRONTIER TOTAL
PRO-ADMIN 7 (58%) 11 (85%) 18 (72%)
ANTI-ADMIN 5 (42%) 2 (15%) 7 (28%)
12 (100%) 13 (100%) 25 (100%:
* Bourne of Massachusetts again sided with the anti-Admin faction 
on this issue. See Appendix E for list of bloc members.
enlarged regular army, disputing the administration's claims of
the need for such an army.
Another possible influence on voting patterns that could 
serve to explain potential divisions is section. In Table 5, a
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strong sectional pattern is apparent in the bloc voting on the 
militia bills. The two blocs are equally clannish. The ten 
representatives of Bloc Two, the pro-Militia bloc, include only 
two congressmen from the North, Abraham Clark of New Jersey and 
Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire. The idea of a "Solid South” 
at this time is offset, however, by the presence of three 
southerners, all from South Carolina, in the pro-administration 
bloc. William Loughton Smith of South Carolina was one of the 
budding stars of Federalism at this time, and his commercial and 
political aspirations behooved him to toe the Federalist party 
line; he probably influenced his comrades Barnwell and Huger to 
vote with him as well.9
TABLE 5
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY SECTION
MILITIA ISSUE
BLOCK 1: 
PRO-REGULAR
BLOCK 2: 
PRO-MILITIA TOTAL
NORTH 10 (83%) 1 (12%) 11 (55%)
SOUTH 2 (17%) 7 (88%) 9 (45%)
12 (100%) 8 (100%) 20 (100%)
FRONTIER 0 (0%) 6 (75%) 6 (30%)
SETTLED 12 (100%) 2 (25%) 14 (70%)
12 (100%) 8 (100%) 20 (100%)
Another sectional division may have been between east and 
west, or, more precisely, frontier versus settled areas. At this 
time the frontier would include not only western parts of larger 
states, but also the Maine district of Massachusetts, Vermont,
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New Hampshire, and Georgia. As Tables 5 and 6 indicate, the 
number of frontier congressmen voting in either bloc on defense 
bills are slight in this Congress, and their meager vote is split 
on the militia issue. The reason for this situation is that the 
frontier congressmen were too few in number to be effectively 
heard at this time, since the Atlantic seaboard was still the 
dominant political force in the country. It would be difficult 
to reach any firm conclusions, but one should note a tendency for 
the frontier congressmen to be more oriented toward militia than 
regulars. Whether such congressmen accurately reflected the 
feelings of their constituents, of course, is anybody's guess.
For purposes of Table 5, Pennsylvania is considered as a northern 
state.
TABLE 6
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY SECTION
FRONTIER ISSUE
PRO-REGULAR PRO-■MILITIA TOTAL
NORTH 6 (46%) 7 (58%) 13 (52%)
SOUTH 7 (54%) 5 (42%) 12 (48%)
13 (100%) 12 (100%) 25 (100%)
FRONTIER 1 (8%) 6 (50%) 7 (28%)
SETTLED 12 (92%) 6 (50%) 18 (72%)
13 (100%) 12 (100%) 25 (100%)
Another variable that might shed some light on bloc members 
voting patterns is detailed in Table Seven. In Table 1 House 
members who are veterans show a marked tendency to vote against 
the Uniform Militia Act, possibly due to the weakness of the
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measure. In Table 7, however, when examining the relatively tiny 
voting blocs that are the members who vote in definite groups on 
military matters, no dramatic pattern emerges. A good reason for 
this lack of a vivid voting contrast might be that most of the 
other military bills that the members of the Second House faced 
were not so obviously flawed or as emotionally charged as the 
Uniform Militia Act, and thus did not bring out strong feelings 
by veterans in the House.
TABLE 7
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY VETERAN STATUS
MILITIA ISSUE
PRO-REGULAR PRO-■MILITIA TOTAL
VETERAN 6 (50%) 3 (38%) 9 (45%)
NON-VETERAN 6 (50%) 5 (62%) 11 (55%)
12 (100%) 8 (100%) 20 (100%)
FRONTIER ISSUE
PRO-FRONTIER ANTI-•FRONTIER TOTAL
VETERAN 6 (50%) 5 (38%) 11 (44%)
NON-VETERAN 6 (50%) 8 (62%) 14 (56%)
12 (100%) 13 (100%) 25 (100%)
The lack of a consensus in congressional voting on military 
issues becomes more apparent when viewed in the light of the 
overall voting business of the Second House. In contrast to the 
relatively miniature voting blocs that occurred on the military 
issues of the Second Congress, cluster-bloc analysis of the 
entire House of Representatives for this period showed that, when 
members had at least thirty mutual votes, they tended to fall
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into distinct, recognizable voting patterns. As is apparent in 
Table 8, the anti-administration faction had the overall strength 
to be a significant influence in the deliberations of the Second 
Congress.
TABLE 8
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY FACTION, SECOND CONGRESS 
TOTAL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION ANTI-ADMINISTRATION TOTAL 
CONGRESSMEN* CONGRESSMEN
ADMIN BLOC 12 ( 27%) 0 ( 0%) 12 ( 17%)
ADMIN FRINGE 11 ( 24%) 2 ( 7%) 13 ( 18%)
TOTAL ADMIN 
ATTITUDE
23 ( 51%) 2 ( 7%) 25 ( 35%)
ANTI-ADMIN BLOC 4 ( 9%) 10 ( 37%) 14 ( 19%)
ANTI-ADMIN FRINGE 3 ( 6%) 7 ( 26%) 10 ( 14%)
TOTAL ANTI-ADMIN 
ATTITUDE
7 ( 15%) 17 ( 63%) 24 ( 33%)
BLOC TOTALS 
NON-BLOC
30 ( 67%) 19 ( 70%) 49 ( 68%)
MEMBERS 15 ( 33%) 8 ( 30%) 23 ( 32%)
TOTAL 45 (100%) 27 (100%) 72 (100%)
* As Appendix F shows, Congressman Shearjashub Bourne of 
Massachusetts voted with the Administration at least 70 percent 
of the time on issues before the House. Therefore he is included 
here in the Administration faction here despite his designation 
by Parsons as an Independent.
Table 8 shows the extent to which partisan voting behavior 
had begun to emerge in the House of Representatives during the 
Second Congress. Significantly, 68 percent of the 72 members 
voted either as members of a bloc or as members of an associated 
fringe. This is particularly striking when one considers the
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constant flux in membership that this House experienced. Due to 
Kentucky's admission to the Union in June 1792, the two members 
from Kentucky did not take their seats until half the term of the 
Second Congress had been completed. This and such factors as 
illness and family problems, not to mention Anthony Wayne's 
forced departure from his seat in the House, resulted in nine 
members of the Second Congress not serving a complete term.10 
When one applies a consistent agreement threshold of 70 percent 
for inclusion in a voting bloc and requires at least 30 mutual 
votes out of the 102 total votes of this House, cluster-bloc 
analysis reveals a surprising degree of voting polarity on the 
total business of the Second Congress. Nevertheless, the 
relatively low state of party development that characterized the 
Second House explains why a full 32 percent of this House's 
members do not fit into either a bloc or fringe. The fact that 
such a large number of legislators did not yet regularly vote in 
easily definable blocs also goes a long way toward accounting for 
the relatively small bloc numbers and negligible fringes found in 
the roll-call record on the militia and frontier bills as 
separate entities. By narrowing the pool of votes from 102 to 
groupings of five and six, the possibility of excluding voting 
partners jumps significantly.
One evidence that members of the Anti-administration faction 
were beginning to band together is the low level of crossover 
voting that appears in Table 8. After all the votes of the 
Second House are considered it becomes apparent that the 
opposition had begun to solidify. Particularly good evidence 
that Fisher Ames was correct in his assertion that "Virginia
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moves in a solid column" can be seen in Appendix F, where the 
entire Virginia delegation appears, dominating the 
Anti-administration faction.11 The increasingly sectional nature 
of voting behavior is obvious here and in the fringe group for 
the anti-administration faction. In this appendix no northerner 
save William Findley of Pennsylvania appears as a member of the 
anti-administration faction, and only two Pennsylvania 
legislators and one New Yorker side consistently with the 
opposition. With the exception of some of the South Carolina 
delegation, most of the southern members had begun to follow 
Madison's lead in opposing Federalist legislative measures, and 
Rice-Beyle cluster bloc analysis makes this deepening sectional 
division dramatically apparent.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
As the Second Congress closed it could look back on having 
created the foundation of the American military establishment for 
the next century. In the Frontier Bill, or Five-Regiment Act, it 
had created the precedent for an expanded regular army to bear 
the brunt of the nation's military demands. In the Uniform 
Militia Act of 1792, it had continued the American tradition of 
paying lip service to the concept of a militia comprised of the 
average citizen, ready at a moment's notice to defend home and 
hearth. Although some of the supporters of the Uniform Militia 
Act did not realize it at the time they sent the measure to the 
Senate, the bill accelerated the decline of the militia system in 
the nation. Both the passage of the Frontier Bill and the 
Uniform Militia Act were hastened by the disasters which had 
beset the sloppily organized military campaigns of Harmar and St. 
Clair on the northwest frontier.
The coincidental appearance before the House of both the 
Uniform Militia Act and the Frontier Bill served to point up the 
philosophical differences present among members of the House 
concerning military matters. While the militia bill had lingered 
in committee for almost two years before coming out for public 
debate, the Frontier Bill was spawned out of the necessity for a 
more solid regular military force to defend the outer reaches of 
United States territory. The two bills became intertwined in the
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discussions of military matters by congressmen, as supporters of 
the militia would refer to sinister implications of the Frontier 
Bill for the nation's future, while supporters of a more 
efficient military would point out the obvious flaws in the 
militia plan.
The passage of the Frontier Bill resulted after often bitter 
accusations by states-rights congressmen that the federal 
government was using the measure to rob the citizens of their 
freedoms.1 Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania voiced his 
disgust with the bill when he said "the business of the militia 
stands still, and the Military Establishment bill is passed with 
all the art and address of ministerial management."2 Mindful of 
the excesses of the recent colonial past, some men feared the use 
of a "standing army" to pacify the Indian tribes of the frontier. 
Many felt that the enlargement of the regular army was an attempt 
to strip away the hard-won liberties of the people. The 
high-toned Federalist Fisher Ames would have not allayed such 
men's fears if they had known his private opinions on how to 
handle the Indian military dilemma. Noting that some of the 
back-country people were "averse to regulars" Ames noted an 
advantage to sending regulars to the West: "so many troops there 
will look as if government could not be resisted, and the excise 
perhaps less trifled with."3 This reference to the resistance by 
some to Hamilton's tax programs indicates that there may have 
been some basis to Republican fears of Federalist intentions.
In the end, the need for effective protection of the 
outlying regions of United States territory outweighed the 
objections of the adversaries of the Frontier Bill. As shown by
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cluster-bloc analysis (Table 4), the coherence of the blocs 
favoring and opposing the enlargement of federal military might 
is not tightly confined to geographical groupings. While it 
would seem that such men as John Steele and John Baptista Ashe 
would uniformly support a powerful force to defend their 
potentially exposed frontier areas, such was not always the case. 
In Steele's case, his personal preference for the militia concept 
led him to oppose a larger, more expensive regular army after 
pondering the huge cost of the expanded army.4 Steele's advocacy 
of the militia as opposed to regular troops did not set well with 
his constituents on the edge of a still powerful southern Indian 
confederacy. According to Kemp Plummer Battle, the editor of 
Steele's papers, "Mr. Steele's cause in moving to reduce the 
army, being perverted into indifference to the sufferings of the 
frontiersmen from Indian hostilities, probably caused his defeat 
for the 3rd Congress."5
The urgency of creating a force capable of opposing the 
Indian military coalition was paramount, while President 
Washington and Secretary of War Knox bought time by pursuing a 
policy of negotiation with the Indian tribes. After the defeat 
of St. Clair's army in November 1791, the regular army consisted 
of only scattered fragments, many of which were needed to 
garrison widely scattered forts on the frontier. Without a 
much-strengthened and well-trained regular army, offensive 
operations against the Indian forces would be impossible, since 
militia forces had proved unmanageable on extended campaigns.6
After the passage of the Five Regiment bill enlarging the 
regular army, progress toward a more effective regular military
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force proceeded slowly and inexorably. Rather than squander his 
forces in a hasty, ill-planned campaign as his predecessors had 
done, the newly-appointed Commander of the Legion of the United 
States Anthony Wayne, contrary to his "Mad" title, took nearly 
two years to train and equip his men properly before using them 
in a march against the northwest tribes. With careful planning 
and strict precautions against ambush, Wayne was able to break 
the military power of the Wabash Indians at the Battle of Fallen 
Timbers in August 1794. This smashing victory ended years of 
military frustration and disgrace for the new nation, years which 
had seen five out of every six government dollars spent on the 
war in the West, with disastrously meager returns.7 The Indian 
tribes of the frontier had expected their former allies, the 
British, to assist them logistically and militarily in their 
efforts against Wayne. That aid was not forthcoming due to the 
obviously revitalized and aggressive American military presence 
on the frontier, and the Indians signed the Treaty of Greenville 
in 1795. The regular army had proved its worth.
The passage of the Frontier Act began a trend that continued 
until World War I, that of expanding the country's regular forces 
to meet permanent defense requirements and relying on the regular 
army plus volunteers to shoulder the load of extended campaigns 
against other countries. Except for the War of 1812, militia saw 
little duty other than short-term Indian conflicts before the 
Civil War and occasional strike duty after. A cynical person 
might also say that the act is also part of a trend of using a 
military crisis to justify the enlargement of the military and 
its role in the nation's policy development.
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With the Uniform Militia Act, the denouement was not so 
satisfying to supporters of the militia concept. As some had 
predicted, the bill received very uneven application in the 
different states, as some states required a vigorous, active 
militia, while others, less exposed to danger, felt militia 
service more a nuisance than a necessity. Those states which had 
always had a strong tradition of militia service, such as 
Massachusetts, provided substantial penalties for non-compliance 
with militia requirements. For example, men who appeared on 
muster days without arms were liable to be lent out to a term of 
service specified by the selectmen of the town.8 For the same 
offense, Maryland fined the unarmed man a mere one cent per day, 
while Pennsylvania had no fines or punishment for appearing 
without arms. North Carolina gave local militia leaders the 
option of loaning weapons to those unable to bring their own, 
provided they returned them after drill was complete.9
In 1794, a committee of the Third Congress considered 
amending the Uniform Militia Act because of complaints regarding 
its effectiveness, but hesitated to act, as did all other 
congresses until the end of the nineteenth century. The 
committee said that since the "right of training the militia is 
constitutionally reserved to the States, if they can be impressed 
with the importance of exercising this power, and directing its 
operation, more especially to the light infantry, an efficient 
force may be thereby created, and equal to any that can probably 
be obtained by any additional law of the United States, made 
under the constitutional powers of Congress." The committee 
concluded that no further amendment was necessary to the act
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pending further experience with it.10 Although proposals to 
reform the act would reappear from time to time, the congressmen 
would not act on them due to the sticky nature of the problem of 
universal military obligation.11
According to Theodore Sedgwick's report to Congress in 1794, 
the total of the militia available from the states amounted to 
approximately 80,000 men, with Massachusetts, Virginia, and 
Pennsylvania providing over 30,000 of this total.12 This force, 
at least on paper, dwarfed the 3,629 regulars on duty at the 
time.13 While the enormous paper army of militia could not 
possibly possess anywhere near the fighting strength suggested by 
Sedgwick's statistics, due to inconsistent training and arming, 
there is perhaps some credence to Jim Dan Hill's assertion that 
the Uniform Militia Act was never intended to produce a uniformly 
effective field army, but rather to serve as a means of 
registering able-bodied men for potential active duty.14
At any rate, the Uniform Militia Act did not prove to be the 
instrument originally envisioned by Henry Knox that would provide 
a place where young Americans could learn a "glorious national 
spirit" and absorb noble personal characteristics that would make 
them better citizens.15 Writing in 1794, Knox acknowledged the 
flaws in the final product, especially the requirement for each 
man to provide his own firearm: "The militia are requested to 
arm and equip themselves, at their own expense; but there is no 
penalty to enforce the injunction of the law. 1,16 Knox noted the 
danger of the shortage of arms (about 5,000) for the militia 
during the Whiskey Rebellion: "The late experiment proves, at 
least in some parts, that the laws were inefficient, and had it
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not been for voluntary zeal, which came to its aid, the community 
might have experienced great evils."17
Knox never retreated from his position that only by having 
an elite, mobile force comprised of socially expendable citizens 
able to rush to trouble spots could the nation have a workable 
militia system. Writing to Congress in 1794, Knox offered a 
forlorn hope that the Uniform Militia Act could be modified to 
realize his concept of a select force within the mass of the 
militia: "Whether the act in question is susceptible of such
attention and amendments, on its present principles, as will 
secure the advantages to be derived from a well-organized 
militia, or whether a limited, but select, and efficient corps of 
militia, formed on a principle of rotation, or otherwise, and 
taken from the classes least injurious to the industry of the 
community, would not better fulfill that object, and at the same 
time better comport with economy are questions which the wisdom 
of Congress alone is competent to decide."18 As Frederick Bernays 
Wiener notes, not until the Dick Act of 1903 and the National 
Defense Act of 1916 would Congress act to reorganize the nation's 
militia plan into a practical system.19
The War of 1812 provided evidence of how the rhetoric about 
the militia differed from the reality. Conflicts over how the 
militia should be used created militarily untenable situations at 
times. Some militia conveniently reverted to the British notion 
of militia as purely defensive, and at inopportune times. At the 
battle of Queenston in October 1812, the militia contingent 
refused to cross the Niagara River into Canada, and watched their 
regular army comrades get slaughtered by British forces.20
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Further evidence of the unsuitability of hastily assembled 
militia came when 4,400 men gathered from the community met 
British regulars outside Washington, D.C. The resulting rout 
("the Bladensburg Races") swept up several in the administration, 
including, ironically, then-President James Madison.21 The raw 
militia of the country was spared embarrassment during the 
Mexican War since it "was fought on foreign soil, and therefore 
it was not possible to call up the militia which claimed 
constitutional immunity against being used as an invading 
force."22 As a result, the war was fought mostly with regulars, 
although many individual members of the state militias saw duty 
in Mexico.
The Civil War dramatically showed the shortcomings of what 
George Washington once called "a mistaken dependence on the 
militia;" the initial campaign of the war had to be fought with 
militia, which by law could not be called into federal service 
for more than three months.23 One unwanted effect of this use of 
militia was the untimely departure of some of the Union soldiers 
during the midst of the battle of Bull Run when their obligation 
had expired. According to Galloway, "the failure of the state 
militia system led to the draft."24
When I originally approached the problem of analyzing the 
Second Congress' military roll calls through cluster bloc 
analysis, I expected that the voting patterns would break down 
into neat segments that would reflect obvious voting tendencies. 
Unfortunately, the period's lack of party development complicated 
the matter. Since the great foreign crises with France and 
England that would serve to accelerate political cleavage had not
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yet reached fever pitch, congressmen tended to vote in ways that 
defied the polarization of each subsequent Congress.
Analysis of all 102 votes and all House members makes 
apparent the general trend toward sectional voting that was at 
work in the Second Congress. Federalist New Englanders, led by 
the redoubtable Fisher Ames and Theodore Sedgwick of 
Massachusetts, and assisted in part by a few sympathetically 
oriented South Carolinians, voted in a bloc opposed regularly by 
the other Southern and Mid-Atlantic states. The Virginians, led 
by James Madison, voted consistently with several North 
Carolinians and Pennsylvanians overall, usually taking what would 
soon be called the Republican position. In this movement toward 
regional political identification were the seeds for far more 
dangerous disagreements in the nation's future.
Within the fringes of both groups, however, were independent 
thinkers, such as the notably quirky Elbridge Gerry, who voted on 
issues according to the dictates of their whim, rather than 
following a designated party line. While such men would have 
bedeviled the serenity of potential party leaders, their presence 
is a factor not found as often in later congresses, when parties 
had coalesced into solid entities. The independence of men such 
as Gerry and the various members appointed to fill seats vacated 
due to illness or personal problems must be considered as a 
factor also when noting the relatively small voting blocs 
developed on militia and frontier issues.
Using the seventy percent agreement level used throughout 
the analysis, the six militia roll calls produced a strong 
Federalist bloc. This group voted regularly in support of
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administration measures, and includes several members of what 
could be called the master bloc of Federalist congressmen. The 
bloc which opposed them was composed primarily of Virginians and 
North Carolinians, who voted on militia measures in a manner 
calculated to preserve the sanctity of state sovereignty over the 
militia and prevent the encroachment of federal power on personal 
liberties.
The fact that voting on the Uniform Militia Act itself 
combines members of the Federalist bloc with a few of the 
opposition bloc attests to the scrambled appeal of the bill, and 
the strength of the cross pressures created by two different 
(though similar) issues. Strong supporters of the militia, such 
as Madison and Steele, favored a sturdy militia, while strong 
Federalists, such as Ames and William Loughton Smith, favored an 
extension of federal authority and control over the state 
militia. Thus, some intersection occurred between blocs on the 
militia vote itself.
Another factor that must have been at play when men were 
making their voting choices in the Second House was whether a 
member had seen military service of some sort. Despite all the 
rhetoric about the virtues of a Saxon-like militia, members who 
had actually seen combat could not, for the most part, bring 
themselves to vote for the Uniform Militia Act. Table One shows 
the difference between veterans and non-veterans on this point, 
with 68 percent of the members who had been exposed to the 
realities of war voting against the haphazard militia bill.
While the same striking contrast does not occur between veterans 
and non-veterans when they are examined in voting blocs, few
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combat veterans voiced more than token acknowledgement to the 
concept of a militia. Most, especially hard-bitten soldiers like 
Anthony Wayne and Artemas Ward, sneered at the idea of militia 
ever being anything more than cannon fodder. Interestingly, one 
of the most vigorous proponents of the militia concept was James 
Madison, whose experiences with untrained troops years later at 
the Battle of Bladensburg would provide further fuel to 
detractors of the militia.
On votes dealing with the issue of a stronger federal army, 
which I grouped together as Frontier votes, there is less 
cohesion in the voting blocs. Rather than groups that link 
together by region or party, the blocs take on a more random form 
than on the militia issue. The apparently scattered nature of 
the voting blocs is attributable to the variety of interests 
facing the congressmen on this issue. Some men, such as Ashe and 
Steele of North Carolina, were in the position of needing a 
military presence near their home districts due to the Indian 
threat, and voted for a stronger regular military although their 
hearts lay with the militia. Others, such as Artemas Ward, who 
had led militia during the first exciting days of the Revolution, 
voted for a stronger regular army out of a belief in a more 
powerful and effective federal military. The issue of a more 
potent regular army on the frontier seems to have been one that 
transcended future party lines and came down to the personal 
beliefs of the individual members.
The members of the Second Congress passed several bills that 
have influence to this day. The Frontier Bill established a 
precedent of massive defense expenditures for the nation which
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has continued periodically since then. The Uniform Militia Act, 
although ineffective and soon relegated to obscurity, continued 
the philosophical tradition of the citizen soldier that had been 
in place since the Jamestown and Plymouth settlements and remains 
with us to this day. By enacting this legislation, the Second 
Congress perpetuated the notion, or myth, of the sturdy citizen 
who would spring to arms in his country's defense at a moments' 
notice. As the nation's leading military historian, Russell F. 
Weigley, put it, "The Militia Act of 1792 was not useless; it 
preserved if it did not improve the inherited tradition of a 
citizen soldiery, and that tradition was to assist the nation 
often in future years."25
The issue of how the Uniform Militia Act was passed remains 
something of a mystery. For months at a time after its 
introduction to the House it lay on the shelf in committee, 
rarely emerging for discussion until the St. Clair disaster 
prompted renewed interest in things military. A future 
researcher might do well to track in detail the passage of the 
bill from its introduction in 1790 until its passage in 1792. Of 
even more interest might be either proving or disproving Richard 
Kohn's suggestion that the final passage of the Uniform Militia 
Act in its watered-down form was actually a clever attempt by the 
Federalists to destroy the existing state militia systems of the 
country. The notion is an intriguing one, but concrete evidence 
might prove difficult to obtain, since any conspirators in such a 
plot are long dead and naturally would have been stealthy in 
their activities. It is curious that the Federalists, who 
espoused a strong military, allowed what was previously a
113
vigorous, if uneven, state militia system to atrophy into 
insignificance.
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APPENDIX A
DEFENSE RELATED ROLL CALLS IN THE SECOND CONGRESS
Roll Call 1 
D a t e : 
M e a s u r e :
Is s u e :
Vote: 
R e s u l t :
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
Roll Call 2 
Date: 
Measure:
Is s u e :
Vote: 
R e s u l t :
January 30,1792
To amend H. R. 162, a bill to 
make further and more effectual 
provision for the protection of 
the frontiers of the United 
States by eliminating the 
second section which provides 
for the raising of three 
additional regiments of 
infantry.
This amendment would eliminate theexpense of equipping and arming 
about 3,000 regular soldiers for 
the nation's defense by not 
raising them.
Yea 18, Nay 34.
H. R. 162 comes to a vote in its
original form, which provides 
for an expanded regular army for 
the defense of the frontier.
Annals, 354; Journal, 2H, IS, 87.
HO21014
Card 1, column 46.
A nay vote would indicate approval 
of the enlargement of the regular 
army for the defense of the 
frontier.
February 1, 1792
To pass H. R. 162, a bill to make 
further and more effectual 
provision for the protection of 
the frontiers of the United 
States.
This bill, sometimes referred to
as "The Frontier B i l l , " would 
authorize the raising of three 
additional regiments of regular 
infantry for use in the Indian war 
then raging. This would bring the 
strength of the U. S. Army to a 
total of five regiments.
Yea 29, Nay 19.
A  shift began in American military 
policy towards a much greater 
reliance on regular troops in the 
Indian c a mpaigns.
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Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
Roll Call 3 
Date: 
Measure:
Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
Annals. 355. Journal, 2H, IS, 500.
H021015
Card 1, Column 47.
A yea vote would indicate approval
of the enlargement of the regular 
army for the defense of the 
frontier and a more efficient 
approach to the nation's defense, 
despite the greatly increased 
cost of maintaining this force.
The vote on this issue placed some 
of the members in the position of 
choosing between their fear of a 
larger regular military force and 
the need for a more disciplined 
army to defend a frontier exposed 
to attack by General St. Clair's 
rout.
February 28, 1792
A motion to disagree to the Senate 
amendment to H. R. 162, which 
would strike out the fourteenth 
section which grants exclusive 
authority to the President to 
appoint officers.
The motion in question voices 
House desire to restore the 
President's power to appoint 
officers to the force being 
raised for the defense of the 
frontiers. The House wants the 
President to have the power to 
appoint officers in the interim 
between sessions of Congress; the 
Senate had killed this provision.
Yea 43, Nay 9. The House
disagrees to the proposed 
amendment of the Senate.
The House affirms the right of the 
President to make interim 
appointments of officers to the 
three additional regiments being 
raised for the defense of the 
frontier.
Annals, 430; Journal, 2H, IS, 117.
H021025
Card 1, column 57.
A yea vote would indicate approval
of the enlargement of the regular 
army, or at least executive 
appointment of officers; it would 
also indicate that a delay in 
raising the regiments would not be 
"consistent with the public safety."
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Roll Call 4 
Date: 
Measure:
Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
Roll Call 5 
Date: 
Measure:
Issue:
Vote: 
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location:
March 6, 1792
To pass H. R. 102, the Uniform
Militia Act (also referred to in 
the ICPSR data as H. R. 148) to 
more effectually provide for the 
national defense, by establishing 
a uniform militia throughout the 
United States.
This bill would require each
able-bodied white male between the 
ages of eighteen and forty-five to 
enroll in a state militia within 
one year from the time the bill 
became law. Further, each man 
was required to arm and equip 
himself according to the act's 
requirements.
Yea 31, Nay 27.
The much-modified Uniform Militia 
Act is approved by the House.
Annals, 435; Journal. 2H, IS. 125.
H021026
Card 1, column 58.
A yea vote would be cast by a
congressman who wished to see a 
militia act of some sort to 
standardize state forces and 
to develop a potentially strong 
army. However, several 
representatives who voted for the 
bill expressed reservations about its 
weaknesses.
April 12, 1792
A motion to amend H. R. 102, an
act to more effectually provide 
for the national defense by 
establishing a uniform militia 
throughout the country by 
extending the authority of the 
President to call up the 
militia in emergencies.
The amendment would empower the 
President to call forth the 
militia "to execute the laws of 
the Union, suppress insurrections, 
and repel invasions."
Yea 37, nay 20.
The President's power to call out
the state militia in emergencies 
is enhanced.
Annals, 552; Journal. 2H, IS, 183.
H021050
Card 2, column 35.
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Attitudinal position: A yea vote would be cast by arepresentative who felt that the 
President needed the flexibility 
of placing the militia under 
national service in a sudden 
crisis. It would indicate support 
for a strong, effective militia.
Roll Call 6
Date : April 12, 1792
Measure: A motion to amend H. R. 102, abill to establish a uniform 
militia, by extending the 
President's authority to 
call up the militia and to provide 
punishment for refusing to obey 
orders while in the service.
Issue: The amendment would provide a
heavy fine or court-martial for a 
militia member who refused an 
order while in federal service.
Vote: Yea 24, Nay 37.
Result: The provision of H. R. 102 thatwould levy stiff penalties on 
disobedient state militia in 
federal service is disagreed to by 
the House.
Location: Annals, 555; Journal, 2H, IS, 184.
ICPSR variable number: H21051
ICPSR location: Card 2, column 36.
Attitudinal position: A yea vote would be cast by a
Representative who desired to 
support federal authority, even 
at the expense of state authority.
Roll Call 7
Date: April 19, 1792
Measure: To amend H. R. 162, a bill toraise a further sum of money for 
the protection of the frontiers by 
increasing the duty on imported 
hemp and cordage and to revive all 
duties previously exempted.
Issue: The amendment would strike outimported cotton from articles 
exempted from duty. This issue 
moved the focus of the debate from 
the protection of the frontier to 
a discussion of the merits of 
Southern cotton.
Vote: Yea 32, Nay 31. The Speaker
declared himself with the nays. 
The question was lost.
Result: The raising of further revenues 
for the protection of the 
frontiers would have to come from 
other sources than the proposed 
plan.
Location: Annals, 562; Journal, 2H, IS, 191.
ICPSR variable number: H021052
ICPSR location: Card 2, column 37.
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Attitudinal position:
Roll Call 8 
D a t e : 
M e a s u r e :
Issue:
Vote: 
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
Roll Call 9 
D a t e : 
M e a s u r e :
Issue:
V o t e : 
Re s u l t :
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location:
A yea vote would be cast by a
congressman who would like to see 
a duty placed on imported cotton, 
thus protecting Southern cotton 
and financing the protection of 
the frontiers. The voting broke 
down into a strong North-South 
sectional voting pattern.
November 21, 1792
To pass the resolution to appoint
a committee to bring in a bill to 
repeal the clause of the militia 
law which relates to the arming 
of the same.
Congressman Murray of Maryland
protested that the clause which 
required each militia member to 
provide his own firearm was unjust 
and unfairly burdened those 
members of society who could least 
afford their own arms.
Yea 6, Nay 50.
The requirement for each member of 
the militia to provide his own 
firearm continues unchanged.
Annals, 710. Journal, 2H, 2S, 20.
H022001
Card 2, column 46.
A  nay vote would be cast by a
congressman who would not want to 
make the Congress accountable for 
arming vast numbers of state 
militia. The issue became one of 
fiscal concern rather than an 
attempt to weaken the militia.
December 18, 1792
To pass a resolution that the
U. S. be authorized to employ such 
part of the military force and 
militia as required for the 
protection of the frontiers and, 
if necessary, to carry on 
offensive operations against the 
five lower Cherokee towns.
The resolution would allow the use
of the regular army or militia not 
only to defend the frontier, 
but also to take the offensive 
against some of the Southern 
tribes.
Yea 21, Nay 27.
Offensive action against the
Indian tribes of the South is
delayed.
Annals, 749. Journal, no entry.
H022005
Card 2, column 50.
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Attitudinal position:
Roll Call 10 
Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote: 
R e s u l t :
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
Roll Call 11 
Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number: 
ICPSR location: 
Attitudinal position:
A yea vote would be cast by a
congressman in favor of the use of 
federal or state forces in a 
destructive offensive campaign 
against Indians.
January 8, 1793
To amend the resolution to reduce 
the military establishment.
The amendment would set a specific
pattern for the reduction of the
military forces of the United States.
Yea 26, Nay 32.
The main resolution for reduction 
of the country's military 
establishment remains undiluted.Annals, 802. Journal, 2H, 2S, 72.
H022008
Card 2, column 53.
A nay vote would reflect a 
congressman's general 
dissatisfaction with the bill for 
reduction of the nation's 
military, and would indicate 
support for a strong army. The 
voting pattern on this vote 
closely resembles that of the 
main vote that immediately 
follows it.
January 8, 1793
To pass the resolution to appoint
a committee to prepare a bill to 
reduce the military establishment 
and to repeal the act for the 
further protection of the 
frontiers.
The proposal put forth by Mr.
Steele of North Carolina would 
significantly reduce the number of 
regular troops in the U. S. Army, 
making the frontier more dependent 
on the militia for defense. The 
measure would save the nation 
a great deal of money in defense 
costs.
Yea 20, Nay 36.
Reliance on regular forces remains 
the dominant means of defense.
Annals, 802. Journal, 2H, 2S, 73.
H022009
Card 2, column 54.
A yea vote indicates a desire to
rely on militia as the principal 
deterrent military force in the 
nation. In the often florid 
debate that preceded the vote, the 
merits and failings of militia 
through the country's history were 
discussed hotly.
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Roll Calls one, two, three, seven, and nine were analyzed 
together as Frontier votes, since they primarily involved the use 
of regular troops or the extension of federal authority over the 
use of the nation's defense forces.
Roll Calls four, five, six, eight, ten, and eleven were analyzed as 
Militia votes, since they dealt with militia forces.
APPENDIX B
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
SECOND CONGRESS, 1791-1793
Representative Partv1 State
Ames, Fisher Ad Mass.
Ashe, John Baptista A-Ad N.C.Car
Baldwin, Abraham Ad Gel.
Barnwell, Robert Ad s . c .
Benson, Egbert Ad N. Y.
Boudinot, Elias Ad N. J.
Bourne, Shearjashub Independent Mass.
Bourn, Benjamin Ad R. I. .
Brown, John A-Ad Va.
Clark, Abraham Ad N. J.
Dayton, Jonathan Ad N. J.
Findley, William Ad Pa.
Fitzsimmons, Thomas Ad Pa.
Gerry, Elbridge A-Ad Mass.
Giles, William B. A-Ad Va.
Gilman, Nicholas Ad N.H.
Goodhue, Benjamin Ad Mass.
Gordon, James Ad N. Y.
Greenup, Christopher A-Ad Ky.
Gregg, Andrew A-Ad Pa.
Griffin, Samuel A-Ad Va.
Grove, William Barry A-Ad N.C.
Hartley, Thomas Ad Pa.
Hiester, Daniel Ad Pa.
Hillhouse, James Ad Conn.
Hindman, William Ad Md.
Huger, Daniel A-Ad S.C.
Jacobs, Israel Ad Pa.
Key, Philip Ad Md.
Kitchell, Aaron Ad N. J.
Kittera, John Ad Pa.
Laurance, John Ad N. Y.
Learned, Amasa Ad Conn.
Lee, Richard Bland Ad Va.
Leonard, George Ad Mass.
Livermore, Samuel A-Ad N.H.
Macon, Nathaniel Ad N.C.
Madison, James A-Ad Va.
Mercer, John Francis A-Ad Md.
Milledge, John A-Ad Gel.
Moore, Andrew A-Ad Va.
Muhlenberg, Frederick Augustus Ad Pa.
Murray, William Vans Ad Md.
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Niles, Nathaniel A-Ad Vt.
Orr, Alexander A-Ad Ky.
Page, John A-Ad Va.
Parker, Josiah A-Ad Va.
Pinkney, William Ad Md.
Schoonmaker, Cornelius C. A-Ad N. Y.
Sedgwick, Theodore Ad Mass
Seney, Joshua Ad Md.
Sheridine, Upton A-Ad Md.
Silvester, Peter Ad N. Y.
Smith, Israel A-Ad Vt.
Smith, Jeremiah Ad N.H.
Smith, William Loughton Ad S.C.
Steele, John Ad N.C.
Sterett, Samuel A-Ad Md.
Sturges, Jonathan Ad Conn
Sumter, Thomas A-Ad S.C.
Thacher, George Ad Mass
Tredwell, Thomas A-Ad N. Y.
Trumbull, Jonathan Ad Conn
Tucker, Thomas Tudor Ad S.C.
Venable, Abraham A-Ad Va.
Vining, John Ad Del.
Wadsworth, Jeremiah Ad Conn
Ward, Artemas Ad Mass
Wayne, Anthony Ad Go..
White, Alexander A-Ad Va.
Williamson, Hugh Ad N.C.
Willis, Francis A-Ad Ga.
There were a total of seventy-two members during the Second 
Congress.
xDesignations for this period of early party development are 
taken from Stanley B. Parsons, William W. Beach, and Dan Hermann, 
United States Congressional Districts, 1788-1841 (Westport, Conn. 
Greenwood Press, 1978). Parsons uses the designations 
Administration and Anti-Administration in lieu of the labels 
Federalist and Democrat, which are more appropriate in later 
congresses.
APPENDIX C
HOUSE MEMBERS EXCLUDED FROM ANALYSIS
The following House members have been excluded from analysis 
due to an insufficient voting record.
Representative (N=7) Party State
Brown, John A-Ad Va.
Greenup, Christopher A-Ad Ky.
Hindman, William Ad Md.
Leonard, George Ad Mass
Milledge, John A-Ad Gel.
Orr, Alexander A-Ad Ky.
Pinkney, William Ad Md.
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APPENDIX D
BLOC STRUCTURE OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
ON SIX MILITIA ROLL CALLS, SECOND CONGRESS
PRO-REGULAR (N=12) 
Representatives Partv State
Ames, Fisher Ad Mass.
Barnwell, Robert Ad S.C.
Benson, Egbert Ad N. Y.
Bourne, Shearjashub Independent Mass.
Fitzsimmons, Thomas Ad Pa.
Hartley, Thomas Ad Pa.
Hillhouse, James Ad Conn.
Huger, Daniel A-Ad S.C.
Kittera, John Ad Pa.
Laurance, John Ad N. Y.
Silvester, Peter Ad N. Y.
Thacher, George Ad Mass.
PRO-MILITIA (N=8) 
Representative
Ashe, John Baptista 
Giles, William B. 
Grove, William Barry 
Livermore, Samuel 
Macon, Nathaniel 
Parker, Josiah 
Steele, John 
Venable, Abraham
Party State
A-Ad N.C.
A-Ad Va.
A-Ad N.C.
A-Ad N.H.
Ad N.C.
A-Ad Va.
Ad N.C.
A-Ad Va.
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APPENDIX E
BLOC STRUCTURE OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
ON FIVE FRONTIER ROLL CALLS
PRO-FRONTIER(N=12) 
Representative Party State
Ashe, John Baptista A-Ad N.C.
Bourne, Shearjashub Independent Mass.
Bourn, Benjamin Ad R. I.
Gilman, Nicholas Ad N.H.
Goodhue, Benjamin Ad Mass.
Grove, William Barry A-Ad N.C.
Macon, Nathaniel Ad Va.
Niles, Nathaniel A-Ad Vt.
Steele, John Ad N.C.
Sumter, Thomas A-Ad S.C.
Thacher, George Ad Mass.
Ward, Artemas Ad Mass.
ANTI-FRONTIER (N=13) 
Representative Partv State
Ames, Fisher Ad Mass.
Barnwell, Robert Ad S.C.
Dayton, Jonathan Ad N. J.
Huger, Daniel A-Ad S.C.
Kitchell, Aaron Ad N. J.
Learned, Amasa Ad Conn.
Muhlenberg, Frederick A. Ad Pa.
Murray, William Vans Ad Md.
Seney, Joshua Ad Md.
Silvester, Peter Ad N. Y.
Smith, William L. Ad S.C.
Sterett, Samuel A-Ad Md.
Wadsworth, Jeremiah Ad Conn.
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APPENDIX F
SECOND HOUSE: TOTAL BUSINESS WITH BLOCS/FRINGES 
(102 ROLL CALLS)
ADMINISTRATION BLOC (N=12) 
Representative Party State
Ames, Fisher Ad Mass.
Benson, Egbert Ad N. Y.
Boudinot, Elias Ad N. J.
Bourne, Shearjashub Independent Mass.
Bourn, Benjamin Ad R, I.
Goodhue, Benjamin Ad Mass.
Gordon, James Ad N. Y.
Hillhouse, James Ad Conn.
Leonard, George Ad Mass.
Sedgwick, Theodore Ad Mass.Wadsworth
Jeremiah Ad Conn.
Ward, Artemas Ad Mass.
FRINGE MEMBERS OF 
ON 102
ADMINISTRATION 
ROLL CALLS
BLOC
Representative (N=13) Partv State
Barnwell, Robert Ad S.C.
Dayton, Jonathan Ad Pa.
Fitzsimmons, Thomas Ad Pa.
Gerry, Elbridge A-Ad Mass.
Gilman, Nicholas Ad N.H.
Hartley, Thomas Ad Pa.
Kittera, John Ad Pa.
Laurance, John Ad N.Y.
Livermore, Samuel A-Ad N.H.
Silvester, Peter Ad N.Y.
Smith, William Loughton Ad S.C.
Thacher, George Ad Mass.
Vining, John Ad Del.
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ANTI-ADMINISTRATION BLOC MEMBERS 
ON 102 ROLL CALLS
Representative (N=13) Party State
Ashe, John Baptista 
Baldwin, Abraham 
Brown, John 
Findley, William 
Giles, William 
Griffin, Samuel 
Lee, Richard Bland 
Madison, James 
Moore, Andrew 
Page, John 
Parker, Josiah 
Seney, Joshua 
Venable, Abraham
FRINGE MEMBERS 
ON
Representative (N=10)
Greenup, Christopher 
Gregg, Andrew 
Grove, William Barry 
Hiester, Daniel 
Macon, Nathaniel 
Mercer, John Francis 
Tredwell, Thomas 
Williamson, Hugh 
White Alexander 
Willis, Francis
A-Ad N.C.
Ad Ga.
A-Ad Va.
Ad Pa.
A-Ad Va.
A-Ad Va.
Ad Va.
A-Ad Va.
A-Ad Va.
A-Ad Va.
A-Ad Va.
Ad Md.
A-Ad Va.
OF ANTI-ADMINISTRATION 
102 ROLL CALLS
BLOC
Party State
A-Ad Ky.
A-Ad Pa.
A-Ad N.C.
Ad Pa.
Ad N.C.
A-Ad Md.
A-Ad N. Y.
Ad N.C.
A-Ad Va.
A-Ad Go..
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